JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON TAX REFORM

Introduction

It must be a rare occasion when a judicial officer of the Commonwealth is given the opportunity to comment on a topic which is currently the subject of such high political profile and debate, the more so to be given that opportunity under the shelter of the portals of an academic institution such as the University of Melbourne. Even my judgments are not so protected; they can be subjected to the rigours of intellectual scrutiny on the part of the members of the High Court. On the other hand, I suspect my audience is sufficiently technically adept to critically, but fairly, evaluate the merit or otherwise of what I have to say, that I cannot expect to leave here this evening totally unscathed. And that’s as it should be. The concept of tax reform is so subjective in the perception it generates, that inevitably consensus on whether or not a proposal qualifies as tax reform is impossible to achieve. This has been the case for many years and reflects the diversity of the political background and economic interest among the participants in the tax reform process. In more recent times, the lack of consensus has been exacerbated by the politicisation of that process. In short, the process has been politically hijacked to the detriment of the community at large. The government of the day will put change up in the name of reform, whether or not the change qualifies as such by reference to the generally accepted objective criteria; and the opposition of the day will just as quickly denigrate the change as “another big tax which will leave everyone worse off”, without regard to whether or not the change qualifies as tax reform by
reference to those same criteria. It is little wonder that the Secretary to the Treasury recently said:\footnote{1}:

‘It is difficult to find consensus views among academics, perhaps especially in the social sciences in which even the most abstract theoretical proposition will betray a normative position. And yet, in the domain of tax policy debates, achieving academic consensus is the easy part. It is much tougher to convince a wary public; tougher still cynical media. And it is virtually impossible – in Australia at least – to secure political consensus on any tax proposal other than a straightforward tax cut.’

I would respectfully observe that, based on more recent events, even a straightforward tax cut (albeit for companies) is likely to buy a fight with the other side of politics.

\footnote{2} I have to say that I find this state of affairs extremely disappointing because it will, if it continues, inevitably handicap tax reform in this country and that will, as I said a moment ago, be to the detriment of the community at large. One would hope to find greater qualities of leadership in those who promote themselves as deserving of our electoral patronage. Be that as it may, recent history would suggest that real reform in this country takes time; rarely has it found legislative expression on the heels of the recommendations of the review committee in which its provenance is sourced. So much was recognized by the Asprey Committee:\footnote{2}

‘In matters of taxation, committees of inquiry are ill-advised to offer neat timetables and precise rates or quantities. Moreover, and above all, when a tax system becomes somewhat ossified and somewhat incoherent as has the Australian, and when rather sweeping reforms are under consideration, much public discussion and understanding are essential before large changes can be attempted. Structural reforms will inevitably take some years to implement, rate changes have to be made gradually as the circumstances of the day permit, and transitional problems of much intricacy have to be solved at every point. A proper appreciation of the ultimate aims of what is being proposed requires a presentation that in the first place is in terms of general principles rather than legal or quantitative detail. Strategy comes before tactics.’ [Emphasis added]

Indeed, that, in fact, is what occurred. The important recommendations of the Asprey Committee did not manifest themselves in legislative form for over ten years after the release of the Full Report. There were various reasons for this, but there are many recommendations in the pages of the Henry Review which merit further public discussion and consideration, and one can only hope that the present politicisation of the debate will not impede or handicap that process. Only time will tell whether that hope is realised.

\footnote{3} At the outset, I hasten to add that the views I express here tonight are my views, not those of the Federal Court nor of any of my colleagues on that Court. They are born out of
my experience over 40 years, first as a solicitor and barrister practising in the tax area, and now as a Federal Court judge deciding tax disputations between the Revenue and taxpayers, and are undoubtedly conditioned by that experience. I’ve seen a lot of changes. Many of the changes that have occurred in that time have been monumental, not only in terms of the change, but in their qualitative merit. I’ll return to some of these shortly.

**A Brief Review of Tax Reviews in Australia**

Few, if any, would seek to argue that periodic review of the tax system is not a legitimate nor, indeed, a desirable policy of government in Australia today. From the time the Commonwealth entered the field of income tax in competition with the States in 1915, there have been a number of external reviews of particular aspects of the Australian tax system, or of the laws within that system: The Kerr Royal Commission (1920 – 1922); the Ferguson Royal Commission (1932 – 1934); the Spooner Committee (1950 – 1954); the Hulme Committee (1954 – 1955); the Ligertwood Committee (1959 – 1961); the Mathews Committee (1974 – 1975); the Campbell Committee (1979 – 1983) and the Ralph Review (1998 – 1999); and two external reviews of the overall tax system: the Asprey Committee (1972 – 1975) and the Henry Review (2008 – 2009).

In the last 25 years, particular aspects of the Australian tax system have also been the subject of three Government-led reviews conducted by Treasury which yielded:

1. The June 1985 Draft White Paper; the precursor to the 1985 Tax Summit and changes, some of them attributable to the recommendations of the Asprey Committee, which emanated therefrom: The extension of the income tax base to include capital gains; the enactment of a new tax on employers in respect of fringe benefits provided to employees; the adoption of an imputation system for the taxation of companies and their shareholders; and the adoption of a foreign tax credit system (in place of the exemption system) for giving unilateral relief from double taxation of foreign source income taxed in the country of source;

2. The April 1989 Information Paper; the precursor to the accrual and taxation on a current basis of the income of controlled foreign companies, certain non-resident trusts and foreign investment funds; and
(3) The 1998 ANTS package; the precursor to the goods and services tax (GST) and the Ralph Review into the taxation of business entities and investments and changes emanating therefrom; the adoption of a regime to allow company groups to be taxed on a consolidated basis; as well as lower taxes on capital gains, a lower headline tax rate for companies and scrip for scrip roll-overs.

**The Role of Judges in Tax Reviews**

As a general rule, judges have not actively participated in the review side of the tax reform process. There have been some exceptions such as the late Ken Asprey, the Chairman of the Asprey Committee, who at the time of his appointment was a Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; and the late Sir Gordon Wallace, who replaced Mr JP Hannan on the Spooner Committee when the latter died. Sir Gordon subsequently became the first President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.

I’d suggest that this limited judicial participation in tax reviews has more to do with the boundaries of judicial experience than anything else. Judicial experience is confined to the way in which the existing system, or taxes within that system, operate, and does not extend to the identification and development of tax policy, the drafting of legislation to give effect to that policy, including legislative proposals for the introduction of new taxes. No judge in the course of his curial duties is going to suggest or propose that a new tax be introduced although he may well advocate the introduction of a provision to replace an existing provision which has failed to give effect to intended policy. For example, the substitution of Part IVA for s 260 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* ('ITAA 36'). The comments and observations of judges can provide the catalyst, even if only a slow-burning one, and the parameters for change. Nearly 25 years before the substitution of Pt IVA for s 260 took place, Kitto J said:

‘Section 260 is a difficult provision, inherited from earlier legislation, and long overdue for reform by someone who will take the trouble to analyse his ideas and define his intentions with precision before putting pen to paper.’

Over 20 years later, Mason J (as he then was) said:

‘… the very restricted operation conceded to s 260 by the course of judicial decision … is now settled. It is therefore a source of some surprise that it comes to be relied upon when its defects and deficiencies have been apparent for so long.’
After referring to what Kitto J said in the passage quoted above, his Honour said:

‘This message, despite its clarity, seems not to have reached its intended destination.’

It took another four years before anything was done.

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The late Graham Hill suggested that there may be another reason why judges of Chapter III courts should not get involved in such inquiries or reviews, namely, that judicial participation would raise a constitutional question as to whether participation in the legislative process is compatible with conferral of Commonwealth judicial power in Ch III of the Constitution. Constitutional issues aside, I don’t know that judges are best equipped to set the policy directives that should guide the tax reform process in so far as it is to be served by the introduction of a new tax. On the other hand, judges may well have a valuable contribution to make where what is involved is a major change in the design features of an existing tax having seen it operate, and having had to determine that operation, in the real world.

The Reforms of the Late Twentieth Century

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There were more real reforms to the Australian tax system in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century than there were in the previous seventy years. Many of these reforms have their provenance in the recommendations of the Asprey Committee – the extension of the income base to include capital gains; the adoption of an imputation system for the taxation of companies and their shareholders; the adoption of a foreign tax credit system in place of the exemption system in giving unilateral relief against double taxation; and while it took a further twelve years, the adoption of a goods and services tax in place of the antiquated wholesale sales tax which had hitherto plagued the system.

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Other reforms followed in the form of the controlled foreign company legislation, the non-resident transferor trust legislation and the foreign investment fund legislation, all designed to overcome the deferral of tax on income derived and accumulated by such entities by taxing it on a current basis to the ultimate economic Australian resident owners or controllers.
Finally, with the goods and services tax and other business related measures, came the consolidation regime for the taxation of companies.

These were significant reforms. The fact that the Henry Review did not recommend that their role in the system be abandoned or changed is testimony to their qualification as such. For example, while Henry recommended that consideration should be given to alternatives (to imputation) as part of a further consideration of company income tax arrangements in the longer term, it recommended that dividend imputation should be retained in the short to medium term.34

There was only one major change to the Australian tax system in the latter part of the twentieth century which did not qualify as reform and there are no prizes for guessing what that was: the fringe benefits tax. As an exercise in reform, this tax was, and still is, an absolute disgrace. A tax on a benefit where the tax falls on the provider of the benefit rather than on the recipient of the benefit does not meet any of the criteria by reference to which tax change is to be measured as reform, and I include in that the hallmark of efficiency. Such a tax certainly did not have its provenance in Asprey; rather it was born in New Zealand, where else would you find such a tax, and ‘let loose’ by Treasury with a passion akin to that portrayed a few weeks back on the face of the All Black captain at Ethiad Stadium five metres from the Australian try line.

That the fringe benefits tax fell outside the tax reform criteria is manifest in the recommendation of the Henry Review that:35

‘Fringe benefits that are readily valued and attributable to individual employees should be taxed in the hands of employees through the PAYG system.’

Two observations should be made. First, all fringe benefits must be attributable to individual employees, otherwise they are not fringe benefits: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) Pty Ltd.36 Second, all fringe benefits can be readily valued, if not by reference to accepted principles of valuation, then by reference to statutory formulae; if they can be valued from the point of view of the employer, they can certainly be valued from the point of view of the employee. The sooner this tax is fully written back so that as an impost it falls on the employee receiving the benefit, the better. Hopefully, the Henry Review recommendation will be but a first step in that direction.
Australia’s taxation system, whatever its composition of taxes, and its transfer system, under which the government makes payments or provides concessions to support those in the community who are perceived as requiring such support, are creatures of statute in the sense that statutes provide the medium by which the taxes are levied and the transfers are made. Statutes are also intended to be the medium by which government policy, underlying the tax or transfer, is given effect to, although they do not always succeed in that task. There can be a number of reasons for this, but one that judges have to deal with, perhaps not frequently but too often, is where the textual drafting of the statute does not accommodate judicial construction of the statute, even with the assistance of modern principles of interpretation, to give effect to that policy.

It is generally accepted that the fundamental criteria for assessing tax systems as a whole, or individual taxes within those systems, are equity (or fairness), efficiency and simplicity. As a judge fixed with responsibility for determining taxation disputes between the Revenue and taxpayers and, in the course of doing so, applying the law (both statute and general underlying law) to the facts of a given case, you will not find it surprising to hear me say that it is the criterion of simplicity with which I have the greatest affinity. On the other hand, in the tax reform process that has gone on in this country over the last 25 years, it is simplicity that has invariably given way to equity or efficiency when there is conflict among these aspirational objectives. The result is that the tax system today, and the specific taxes within that system, are far more complex than they were in January 1975 when the Asprey Committee handed down its Full Report. Nonetheless, it is instructive to recall what the Asprey Committee had to say on the subject:

‘3.19 After equity, simplicity is perhaps the next most universally sought after of qualities in individual taxes and tax systems as a whole: like fairness it is a word that, in this context, points to a complex of ideas.

3.20 … A tax will be called simple, relatively to others, if for each dollar raised by it the cost of official administration is small, and if the “compliance costs”, the costs in money and effort of all kinds to the taxpayer, are also small. These two ideas are of course connected, and add up to much the same as the ancient canon of certainty. Both costs will be the less if assessor and assessed can each establish with certainty what is due: uncertainty entails the costs of consultation with experts and sometimes the yet greater costs of litigation. Both kinds of cost are increased, and certainty is endangered, when a tax, whether in the interests of equity or of efficiency, requires the drawing of fine distinctions between what is and what is not liable, and when these distinctions involve such uncertain ideas as “purpose” or “value to the
recipient”. Then the legal definitions get longer and longer and beyond the comprehension of those untrained in the law, and the relevant facts in particular cases become more and more disputable.

3.21 Two further aspects of simplicity require specific mention here. First, when (as is often unavoidable) a quite complex operation is needed before the administrators can make the assessment or the taxpayer can ascertain his liability, it is desirable that the tax be such that the taxpayer, for private purposes unconnected with tax, already needs to perform such operations. A tax on company income may be fairly regarded as a simple tax if the company already calculates its income or profits on the same or very similar basis. A tax on personal income is not a simple tax if it be so structured that many taxpayers who would not otherwise wish (or without hired help be able) to keep accounts at all, have to preserve many records and learn sophisticated accounting. The point, though obvious, is often forgotten.

3.22 A second observation is perhaps even more obvious and even more frequently forgotten. The fewer, per million dollars raised, are the individuals or organisations from whom tax is collected the simpler is a taxation system. The sheikdom that can raise all the revenue it requires (and maybe much more) from a single tax on a single oil company has what is unquestionably the simplest tax system of all.’

Asprey recognised the potential for conflict between these aspirational goals:

‘3.47 In general it does not appear that, in practice, the conflict between simplicity and efficiency need be very great. Certainly when the latter can be interpreted as mainly requiring neutrality, reliance upon a very simple tax, a road-based tax at uniform rates on all goods and services used in consumption, would produce a taxation system that was simple and efficient. Though efficiency may undoubtedly require additional special taxes for special purposes it need not require many if policy instruments other than taxation are also being actively directed to this aim.

3.48 The potential conflict between the ideals of simplicity and equity, by contrast, is apparently very great indeed. The taxes most obviously adapted to the requirements of equity, those technically capable of being adapted to vary the levy upon individuals in accordance with a multitude of differences in their situations considered relevant to equity, are the most complex of taxes: income tax, capital gains tax, gift and estate duties, wealth tax. Hence it appears that a country may have a simple and efficient taxation system or an equitable one but not both.’

Post-Asprey reviews paid lip service to simplicity but were prepared to throw it on the ‘scrapheap of compromise’ where it conflicted with the goal of equity. Treasury’s Draft White Paper of June 1985, Reform of the Australian Tax System, exemplifies the point:

‘1.8 A good tax system should be as simple as possible. A complex tax system makes it difficult for people to understand the law and apply it to their circumstances. The present law has become so complex that it is difficult to convey its meaning simply and adequately on tax return forms and in other printed matter. Complexity imposes high compliance costs on the community and high administrative costs on the tax authorities. Complex tax laws also result in socially unproductive and costly tax litigation. These considerations suggest that, where possible, tax reform
measures capable of ready comprehension and application should be preferred over more complex alternatives.

1.9 This review affords an opportunity to see what can be done to reduce the burden of record-keeping on ordinary taxpayers, to increase the certainty of what is or is not taxable, and to increase the clarity of the tax system.

1.10 The objectives of equity, efficiency and simplicity sometimes conflict. Measures to make the system more equitable, for example, might require complex legislative provisions and may also cause economic distortions. Inevitably, compromises have to be struck among these criteria.

That the tax system and various taxes within the system are more complex today than they have ever been in the past, and this despite the alleged pursuit of simplicity as an aspirational goal by the various tax reviews that have occurred, was recognised by the Henry Review:

‘The complexity of the tax system and the costs of complying with it are perennial concerns, particularly of the business community. Recent research suggests a range of costs associated with this complexity. It reduces transparency, impeding optimal decision making by businesses and individuals and their ability to respond to intended policy signals. It can cause people inadvertently to pay the wrong amount of tax or claim more or less than they are entitled in transfer payments. It is regressive in its impact, affecting mostly those people with the least capacity to deal with complexity and the least access to professional help.

Significant among the causes of complexity are the pursuit of finely calibrated equity and efficiency outcomes, instability in policy settings and people’s incentives to maximise their after-tax and transfer incomes or after-tax business profits. The provision of choice in determining a tax liability can increase complexity and result in higher compliance costs where taxpayers seek to discover the best tax outcome. Complexity may also be compounded where policy settings within the system do not draw on “natural” taxpayer systems or are inconsistent with broader policy objectives of government.

Related to the issue of complexity are the costs of administering and complying with the tax and transfer system. These costs represent a net loss to the economy, because the resources engaged in these activities could otherwise be put to more highly valued uses. Recent research suggests there is an optimal level of system complexity and operating costs, one that balances administration and compliance costs with improved efficiency and distributional outcomes.’

So what is to be done to simplify a system the complexity of which is conceded even by those who have reviewed it and made recommendations as to its improvement albeit on grounds that gains to equity and efficiency outweigh the loss to simplicity. Something will have to be done because if nothing is done then by the middle of this century we will have a tax system the complexity of which is such that administrators will not be able to properly administer it, taxpayers will not be able to properly comply with it, judges will not be able to
properly adjudicate upon it and the stand-alone attributes of equity and efficiency will be so infected with its complexity that, to use the words of the late Ross Parsons, it will be a system which can only be described as an ‘institution in decay’\textsuperscript{38}. The more cynical among us would say that that time has already arrived. But even if it has not, the time has come when the pendulum has to swing back towards giving preference to simplicity, even if it is at the expense of equity and efficiency. It is the balance that is adopted amongst these aspirational goals which will determine whether the tax system we have in the middle of this century is capable of serving the community and the country in a way which meets the demands that will surely come upon us between now and then.

There are, in my view, a number of recommendations of the Henry Review which are directed or pointed towards this swing of the pendulum. Without intending to be exhaustive, they include:

‘A – Personal taxation

A1 – Personal Income tax

**Recommendation 2:** Progressivity in the tax and transfer system should be delivered through the personal income tax rates scale and transfer payments. A high tax-free threshold with a constant marginal rate for most people should be introduced to provide greater transparency and simplicity.

…

**Recommendation 6:** To remove complexity and ensure government assistance is properly targeted, concessional offsets should be removed, rationalised, or replaced by outlays.

…

**Recommendation 8:** All forms of wages and salary for Australian resident taxpayers should be taxable on an equivalent basis and without exemptions.

…

**Recommendation 9:** Fringe benefits that are readily valued and attributable to individual employees should be taxed in the hands of employees through the PAYG system.

…

**Recommendation 11:** A standard deduction should be introduced to cover work-related expenses and the cost of managing tax affairs to simplify personal tax for most taxpayers.

…
Recommendation 17: The capital gains tax regime should be simplified. …

…

B – Investment and entity taxation

…

B2 – The treatment of business entities and their owners

Recommendation 36: The current trust rules should be updated and rewritten to reduce complexity and uncertainty around their application.

…

Recommendation 38: A flow-through entity regime for closely held companies and fixed trusts should not be adopted for now, but would merit further consideration if there is a move away from dividend imputation in the long run.

…

G – Institutions, governance and administration

G1 – A responsive and accountable tax system

Recommendation 111: The government should establish a more transparent means of dealing with community ideas about the tax system by extending the Tax Issues Entry System website and further developing its use.

Recommendation 112: The government should commit to a principles-based approach to tax law design as a way of addressing the growing volume and complexity of tax legislation, and as a way of helping those laws to be interpreted consistently with their policy objectives.’

On the other hand, any attempt to reduce the complexity of the tax system, or particular taxes within that system, is going to fail if the attempt is confined to a redrafting of the text of the legislation without addressing the fundamental cause of the complexity. The ITAA 97 exemplifies this failure and new drafting techniques, such as principles-based drafting, cannot remove what I call architectural or structural complexity. The only way such complexity can be removed is by altering the architecture of the tax. This will involve fundamental change, but that is not a reason for a proposal for such change to be dismissed out of hand. On the contrary, it is a reason for ensuring that facilities are provided to enable public discussion and understanding of the change, what it involves as well as provide sufficient time for that process to take place. As Asprey recognised, structural reforms will inevitably take some years to implement.
Architectural complexity can manifest itself in a variety of forms. For example, distinctions, carve-outs and even exceptions to carve-outs which are designed to give effect to policy can be so dependent on findings of fact that their application or non-application to a prospective transaction is infected with uncertainty from the very outset. Take the distinction between capital and income; the Asprey Committee recognised the problem. At [23.73] of the Full Report, it wrote:

‘23.73. If the Committee’s recommendations with regard to the introduction of a capital gains tax were to be adopted, the recurrent disputes between the Revenue and the taxpayer attendant upon the realisation of various forms of property would be diminished in number. The present conflict in the rival contentions, on the one hand, that the profit is a taxable income-profit and, on the other, that the profit is a non-taxable capital profit, should be reduced for the reason that the difference in the amount of tax exigible in any transaction will be considerably less than under the “all-or-nothing” approach which must result under the legislation in its present form. The problem of distinguishing between capital and income will continue to exist since, with the presence in the system of a capital gains tax, a capital-profit and an income-profit will be brought to tax in ways producing different monetary consequences. That problem is one which has always defied easy solution because the criteria for distinguishing between the two types of profit can, according to circumstances, encompass such a wide variety of matters which may be relevant to its determination that no universally infallible touchstone is possible.’

(Emphasis added.)

In the absence of any legislative guidance as to the distinction between income (revenue) and capital, the courts, over the years, have adopted their own hallmarks of distinction; in this country, at least until recently, hallmarks borrowed from those that had been adopted by the Courts of Chancery in relation to trusts. The late Ross Parsons considered that this was exemplified by the majority decision of the House of Lords in Blott, relying on Bouch v Sproule for its conclusion that a bonus issue of shares was not income of the shareholder for the purposes of the United Kingdom income tax because, in the absence of a different intention in the trust instrument, Bouch v Sproule directed a conclusion that the remainderman was entitled to bonus shares, not the life tenant. Parsons noted that Blott was accepted by Dixon CJ in Fuller as expressing the ‘natural legal meaning’ of income which became, in the context of its development in the interpretation of income tax legislation, the ‘ordinary usage meaning’, although Parsons preferred to call it the ‘judicial concept’.

As well as Parsons, who clearly preferred the economists’ notion of ‘income’ as a base, principally by reference to the work of Henry Simons, which rejected the trust law concept of income built on flows, and embraced the element of ‘gains’, there are other
commentators who have criticised the reliance of Australian courts on the metaphorical language of Pitney J in the United States Supreme Court in *Eisner v Macomber*\(^{45}\), likening the fundamental relation of ‘capital’ to ‘income’ to the tree or the land in the case of the former; the fruit or the crop in the case of the latter; the former as a reservoir supplied from springs; the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time. The criticism was best expressed by Richard Krever twenty years ago\(^{46}\):

‘Australian tax lawyers cite *Eisner v. Macomber* and its fruit and tree analogy as judicial endorsement of the distinction between income and capital and the immunity from income taxation of gains associated with the latter. The case establishes nothing of the kind; in fact, it states quite explicitly that both income and capital gains constitute “income” for “income tax” purposes. To find support in the judgment for a contrary proposition is possible only if the Supreme Court’s ruling is carefully dissected and the extracted parts quoted out of context.

It is exactly this course that Australian tax lawyers, judges and scholars followed. Their acts were deeds of misuse and not abuse, resulting from ignorance and inaccuracy rather than malevolence or deceit. The resulting peculiar Australian legacy of *Eisner v. Macomber* serves as a useful reminder of the narrow and parochial origins of Australian tax jurisprudence and the slowness of its evolution.’

More recently\(^{47}\), it has to be said that the High Court has not sought to hide from the fact that Pitney J made it clear, at least in the United States, that ‘income’ for ‘income tax’ purposes includes ‘… profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets …’\(^{48}\), in other words, capital gains as well as income gains. However, in *Montgomery* the majority made it clear that this was not the position in Australia\(^{49}\):

‘As was noted in *Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd*, both the “ordinary usage meaning” of income and the “flow” concept of income derived from trust law have been criticised. But both the ordinary usage meaning and the flow concept of income are deeply entrenched in Australian taxation law and it was not suggested by either party that there should be any reconsideration of them. Nor was it suggested that they should be replaced by concepts of gain or realised gain, concepts that some economists consider preferable.’

In consequence, there continues to exist great doubt as to the outcome of the application of the relevant criteria or hallmarks of the distinction to the facts of a particular case as is exemplified by the decisions of the High Court in *Montgomery*\(^{50}\) and *McNeil*\(^{51}\) on the income side, and the decisions of the Full Federal Court in *Macquarie Finance*\(^{52}\) and *St George Bank*\(^{53}\) on the outgoings side.

When an issue as to the character of a receipt or receivable comes before a court the Commissioner is invariably contending that it is ‘income’; the taxpayer is contending that it is
not; save where the taxpayer relies on some exemption or other relief, e.g., double tax treaty relief, it is implicit in the taxpayer’s contentions that the receipt or receivable is ‘capital’. There does not appear to be any room for a third category within the area covered by the two concepts as they have been subsumed into the tax base. In other words, on the income side, they cover the field.

When an issue of the deductibility of an outgoing comes before a court, the Commissioner may contend that it is an outgoing of capital or of a capital nature and therefore not deductible. In response to such a contention, the taxpayer will contend that it is not, but before that argument is ventilated, it will only remain a live issue if the taxpayer succeeds in persuading the court that the outgoing satisfies one of the two limbs of s 8-1(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (‘the 1997 Act’).

It is important to a reading and understanding of the jurisprudence in this area that the differences illustrated in [29] and [30] be kept in mind.

In the income tax arena, the capital/income distinction is an architectural complexity which no amount of rewriting or principles-based drafting will remove. My view on the way forward has a number of possible levels. I only propose to mention two. At its highest, I think the time has come for serious consideration to be given and equally serious discussion to take place on what may presently be perceived as a giant step but, with the benefit of hindsight, may be seen as consistent with an evolutionary process, namely, the assimilation of all capital gains and losses to gains and losses on revenue account. Obviously, there would have to be design rules developed to accommodate the assimilation, but I have no doubt that the ingenuity and creativity of those charged with the task would be capable of coming up with design rules to accommodate whatever issues were identified as hurdles, either in the assimilation process or under the ensuing regime. It may be thought desirable to stage the assimilation process so that in the first place it was confined to entities, including individuals, carrying on an enterprise or business; to be extended under a subsequent stage to all taxpayers. The design rules and any staging of the kind suggested would, of necessity, introduce a level of complexity but that would be insignificant compared to the simplicity and certainty that would flow from the assimilation. It would also introduce efficiencies in administration and compliance, and ultimately contribute to horizontal equity by a real broadening of the tax base, from the hybrid base we have at the present time, with the potential for a consequential lowering of the tax rate.

If the assimilation level is perceived to be too high to aim for, either now or in the future, a first or alternative step would be to embark upon a process whereby the
capital/revenue dichotomy, for distinguishing gains on the one hand and outgoings and losses on the other, was written out of our tax legislation; or replaced by a dichotomy far more certain in its application to a prospective transaction; or, where that was not appropriate, by adopting specific deeming rules as to what and when gains, or outgoings and losses, were on revenue account and what and when gains, or outgoings and losses, were on capital account. A replacement dichotomy might be based on the length of time an asset has been held, without regard to whether it was acquired for the purpose of profit-making by the means giving rise to the profit. Deeming provisions provide the potential for even greater flexibility, but at the same time greater certainty in their application to a prospective transaction.

Other architectural or structural complexities can arise for other reasons such as the failure of the legislature to define a fundamental term or phrase. It is then left to the Courts to fill the gap on a case by case basis, hardly a recipe for certainty on a going forward basis. Phrases such as ‘presently entitled’, ‘share of’ and ‘income of the trust estate’ in Division 6 of Part III of the ITAA 36 have cried out for definitional assistance for years, as indeed has the whole structure of Division 6, but it has only been in recent times that those cries seem to have been heard.

Changes to the tax system, or to taxes within the system, designed to remove architectural complexity – what I call micro changes – are as an important part of the tax reform process as changes involving the introduction of a new tax – what I call macro changes. And yet to date proposals for micro change have not received the focus of attention that proposals for macro changes have received. Of course, this has a lot to do with the politicisation of the tax reform debate that I referred to earlier; until recently it has been far easier to sell a new tax in the name of reform by pointing to the failings of the tax it replaces or by broadcasting the rate reductions it will facilitate in other taxes. But if we allow that process to continue without addressing the architectural and structural complexity that is being built up in the system, we will eventually reach a point where the whole system grinds to a halt.

In short, I am strongly of the view that reform going forward must be directed at simplifying the system and the taxes within the system; at removing architectural or structural complexity even if it involves compromising on the criteria of equity and efficiency. How is this best done? Not by establishing tax reviews every ten to fifteen years because, based on recent experience, that only exacerbates the problem. Perhaps a standing committee as a
forum through which such complexities are identified and articulated with a view to formulating various possible solutions for further consideration and discussion. That would be a start because at the moment we are not even on the starting line.

3 As the Asprey Committee observed at [1.2] of its Full Report:
   ‘Even if, as is not the case, the Australian system were generally agreed to be as satisfactory as any tax system ever admitted to be, a periodic thorough inspection would be as wise a precaution in this area of affairs as in any other.’
6 The First to the Fourth and Final reports of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 1932 – 1934.
7 Commonwealth Committee on Taxation on Taxation (1950). The Committee became a standing committee to which the Treasurer referred particular matters (there were over 50 such referrals) on income tax over the period 1950 to 1954. See *Tax Reform: A Tower of Babel; Distinguishing Tax Reform from Tax Change*, Graham Hill, Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association, Vol. 1, No. 1 [2005] JATTA 9.
9 Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (Australia) *Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Rates of Depreciation* (Canberra, 1961).
12 Review of Business Taxation, A System Redesigned (Canberra, 1999).
14 *Australia’s future tax system*, Report to the Treasurer, 23 December 2009 (Henry Review) (Canberra, 2010). The Henry Review was not totally external as it was chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury.
16 Part IIIA of the ITAA 36: Subsequent to the preparation of the Asprey Committee’s preliminary report, the government announced proposals for a capital gains tax to operate with respect to assets disposed of after 17 September 1974. The Committee recommended deferring the introduction of a capital gains tax and that the government’s proposals be abandoned to enable public discussion and critical examination of the proposals to take place. Two days before the Committee furnished its Full Report, the government announced that its plans for the introduction of a capital gains tax had been postponed.
18 Part IIIAA of the ITAA 36.
19 Division 18 of Pt III of the ITAA 36.
20 *Australia, Taxation of Foreign Source Income (An Information Paper)* (Canberra, 1989).
21 Part X and s 47A of the ITAA 36.
22 Division 6AAA of Pt III of the ITAA 36.
23 Part XI of the ITAA 36.
24 Australia (circulated by the Hon. Peter Costello MP), Tax Reform: not a new tax, a new tax system (Canberra, 1998) (ANTS).
26 See en 10.
28 Divisions 114 and 115 of Pt 3-1 of the ITAA 97.
29 Subdivision 124-M of Div 124 of Pt 3-3 of the ITAA 97.
31 Gridland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 140 CLR 330 at 337.
32 At 337, 338.
33 See en 7.
34 Recommendation 37.
35 Recommendation 9.
37 Part One, Overview, p 21.
41 Commissioner of Taxation v W E Fuller Pty Ltd (1959) 101 CLR 403.
42 En 38 at 82.
44 Albeit conceding that no workable scheme which required annual reporting could extend the concept beyond realised gains.
48 At 207.
49 At [66].
50 En. 48.
52 Macquarie Finance Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 146 FCR 77.