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REFERENCE DOCUMENT: LITERATURE ON AUTHORITARIANISM

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Reference Document: Literature on Authoritarianism

This document was prepared as a literature review and reference document for a September 2018 workshop at Deakin University, Melbourne, entitled 'Kinder, Gentler, Smarter Autocracies? Human Rights and Political Participation under Authoritarianism'. The workshop was sponsored by the Alfred Deakin Institute and Electoral Regulation Research Network, and organised by Dr Zim Nwokora (Deakin University).

This document was created in order to provide participants of the workshop with background information on some important literature broadly relating to the themes discussed on the day. It is an overview of some of the key literature, both theoretical and empirical, on authoritarianism. While it cannot claim to be exhaustive, the document provides considerable breadth and it is hoped that it will serve as a useful tool for further scholarship on authoritarianism.

Contents

Primer literature/textbooks.....	4
Key literature	5
Foundational works	5
Ideas on democracy	9
Challenges to mainstream authoritarianism scholarship.....	11
Literature using or formulating specific typologies.....	13
Hybrid regimes (electoral/competitive authoritarianism)	13
Neopatrimonial regimes.....	26
Bureaucratic authoritarianism	27
Populist authoritarianism	29
Empirical literature with little theoretical engagement.....	31
Asia	31
Middle East/North Africa	34
Global comparisons.....	41
Africa.....	44
Other.....	44

Primer literature/textbooks

These works provide entry-level overviews of authoritarianism and related ideas. They are useful for a quick overview of the literature:

Ezrow, Natasha M., Frantz, Erica, 2011, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders*. New York: Continuum.

Erica Frantz, 2018, *Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Erica Frantz, 2018, 'Authoritarian Politics: Trends and Debates', *Politics and Governance*, 6, no. 2, pp. 87-89.

Stephen Haber, 2006, 'Authoritarian Government', in Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. New York: Oxford University Press. 693-707.

A regularly cited work on research methods for studying authoritarian regimes:

Barbara Geddes, 2010, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Key literature

Works in this section can be seen as foundational, since they are cited across much of the more recent empirical literature. Linz' work in particular is treated as authoritative. There are also broader works on democracy which regularly feature in empirical studies.

Foundational works

Author/Study	Defining Authoritarianism		Application of the Concept	
	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Juan J. Linz, 1964, 'An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain', in Erik Allard and Yrjö Littunen (editors), <i>Clevages, Ideologies and Party Systems</i> . Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society.	Authoritarian systems: '...political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.' P. 255	N/A	N/A	Spain, 1950s, 60s.
Juan J. Linz, 2000 [1975], <i>Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes</i> . London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.	Authoritarianism is not totalitarianism: 'The destruction or at least decisive weakening of all the institutions, organizations, and interest groups existing before a new elite takes political power and organizes its own political structures is one of the distinguishing characteristics of totalitarian systems compared with other nondemocratic systems. In this sense we can speak of monopoly of power, monism, with it would be a great mistake to take this concentration of power in the political sphere and in the hands of the people and the organizations created by the political leadership as monolithic. The pluralism of totalitarian systems is not social	Subtypes: 'We shall distinguish: bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes; those forms of institutionalization of authoritarian regimes that we shall call "organic statism"; the mobilizational authoritarian regimes in post-democratic societies, of which the Italian Fascism was in many ways an example; post-independence mobilizational authoritarian regimes; and finally the post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes.' P. 54	Seeking to understand and classify different regimes types.	N/A

	<p>pluralism but political pluralism within the political elite.’ P. 68 (more on p. 70)</p> <p>‘Despite the bureaucratic character of the state and of many organizations and even the party, the mass membership in the party and in related sponsored organizations can give meaning, purpose, and a sense of participation to many citizens. In this respect, totalitarian systems are very different from many other nondemocratic systems—authoritarian regimes—in which the rulers rely fundamentally on a staff of bureaucrats, experts, and policemen, distinct and separate from the rest of the people, who have little or not chance to feel as active participants in the society and polity beyond their personal life and their work.’ P. 73</p>			
<p>Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996, <i>Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe</i>. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.</p>	<p>Linz (1975) ‘wanted to call attention to the fact that between what then were seen as the two major political poles—the democratic pole and the totalitarian pole—there existed a form of polity that had its own internal logic and was a steady regime type. Though this type was non-democratic, Linz argued that it was fundamentally different from a totalitarian regime on four key dimensions—pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization. This was of course what he term an <i>authoritarian regime</i>.’ P. 38</p> <p>Four non-democratic forms of regime:</p> <p>Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, Post-totalitarianism, and Sultanism.</p> <p>These are compared in the tables below, taken from pp. 44-46</p>	<p>‘As Linz’s studies of Spain the in 1950s and early 1960s showed, the four distinctive dimensions of an authoritarian regime—limited pluralism, mentality, somewhat constrained leadership, and weak mobilization—could cohere for a long period as a reinforcing and integrated system that was relatively stable.’ P. 40</p> <p>See related:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Juan J. Linz, 1970, ‘From Falange to Movimiento-Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968,’ in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moorer, eds., <i>Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems</i>. New York: Basic Books, pp. 128-203. - Linz, 1973, ‘Opposition In and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain’, in Robert A. 	<p>Studying how democracies transition from non-democratic regimes, and what they need to consolidate:</p> <p>‘If a functioning state exists, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society.’ P. 7</p> <p>This argument summarised in:</p>	<p>Global (13 countries), large-N.</p>

		Dahl (ed), <i>Regimes and Oppositions</i> . New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 171-259.	Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 7, no. 2, pp. 14-31.	
Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Marina Ottaway, 2003, <i>Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism</i> . Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.	<p>Semi-authoritarian regimes:</p> <p>'They are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. This ambiguous character, furthermore, is deliberate. Semi-authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails. Semi-authoritarian regimes are political hybrids. They allow little real competition for power, thus reducing government accountability. However, they leave enough political space for political parties and organizations of civil society to form, for an independent press to function to some extent, and for some political debate to take place.' P. 3</p> <p>In contrast to democracies:</p> <p>'Semi-authoritarian regimes already do much of what the most widely used democratization projects encourage: They hold regular multiparty elections, allow parliaments to function, and recognize, within limits, the rights of citizens to form associations and of an independent press to operate. Indeed, many countries with semi-authoritarian regimes are beehives of civil society activity, with hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating with foreign support. Many have a very outspoken, even outrageously libelous, independent press. Nevertheless, incumbent governments and parties</p>	<p>In terms of broader concepts, this work tries to break away from the 'end of history' thesis, by not seeing democratisation as the inevitable or even sought goal of regimes in transition (even using the word 'transition' suggests the end point is full liberal democracy. See section on 'transitions' literature, and dangers of the 'democratizing bias' (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 51).</p> <p>On terminology:</p> <p>'Analysts who focus on regime characteristics usually try to capture the ambiguity of gray zone countries by adding a qualifier to the word democracy: semi-, formal, electoral, partial, weak, illiberal, virtual, and many others—the differences seem to be based more on the preference and imagination of the analyst than on the characteristics of different regimes. Attempts to classify hybrid regimes on a continuum, ranging from those that are closest to authoritarianism to those that are closest to democracy, have greater rigor and are more satisfactory in theory, but they tend to break down in the application, given the uncertainty and the inherent instability of most hybrid regimes. I have chosen the term semi-authoritarian to denote these hybrid regimes because labels including the word democracy are not adequate to capture their defining feature, namely, their deliberate nature. Semi-authoritarian</p>	<p>Understanding regimes that have many characteristics of democracy, and yet lack full openness. Also, how to deal with these regimes:</p> <p>'With their combination of positive and negative traits, semi-authoritarian regimes pose a considerable challenge to U.S. policy makers. Such regimes often represent a significant improvement over their predecessors or appear to provide a measure of stability that is welcome in troubled regions. But the superficial stability of many semi-authoritarian regimes usually masks a host of severe problems and unsatisfied demands that need to be dealt with lest they lead to crises in the future' p. 5</p>	Egypt, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Senegal, Croatia. Loose method: historical, narrative, election data (roughly 1970s onwards).

	<p>are in no danger of losing their hold on power, not because they are popular but because they know how to play the democracy game and still retain control.’ P. 6</p> <p>Different types:</p> <p>‘Semi-authoritarian regimes also differ in terms of their internal dynamics and possibilities for further change. In this regard, it is possible to differentiate among three types of semi-authoritarian regimes: regimes in equilibrium, which have established a balance among competing forces and are thus quite stable; regimes in decay, where the authoritarian tendencies appear increasingly strong and the counterbalancing factors weak, suggesting the possibility that the government will revert to full authoritarianism; and regimes that are experiencing dynamic change that may undermine the government’s ability to maintain the status quo, forcing it into opening up new political space and thus providing the possibility of incremental progress toward democracy. ‘p. 20</p>	<p>regimes are not failed democracies or democracies in transition; rather, they are carefully constructed and maintained alternative systems. If semi-authoritarian governments had their way, the system would never change.’ P. 7</p> <p>Characteristics:</p> <p>‘It is useful at this point to set forth some preliminary ideas about the nature and major characteristics of semi-authoritarian regimes to back up the claim that they represent a special type of regime, and are not simply imperfect democracies. In particular, I call attention here to four issues, all of which are discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters of the present study: the way in which power is generated and transferred, the low degree of institutionalization, the weak link between political and economic reform, and the nature of civil society’ p. 14</p>		
<p>Barbara Geddes, 1999, ‘What do we know about democratization after twenty years?’ <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 2, pp. 115-44.</p>	<p>‘classify authoritarian regimes as personalist, military, single-party, or amalgams of the pure types. In military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule and exercises some influence on policy. In single-party regimes, access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and compete in elections. Personalist regimes differ from both military and single-party in that access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer and may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military nor the party exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.’ P. 122</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>‘The primary original contribution of this study is to propose a theoretical innovation that subsumes a number of apparently contradictory arguments. I began this section with a simple game-theoretic portrayal of the incentives facing officers in military regimes as contrasted with the incentives of cadres in single-party and personalist regimes. If the incentives shown in the games are, on average, accurate, then we can understand why the process of transition from military regimes differs from that of single-party and personalist regimes. Because most officers value the unity and capacity</p>	<p>Large-N statistical analysis of 163 regimes worldwide in recent decades.</p>

			of the military institution more than they value holding office, military regimes cling less tightly to power than do other kinds of authoritarianism and, in fact, often initiate transitions.’ P. 140	
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Ideas on democracy

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information
Robert A. Dahl, in Daniel N. Nelson (editor), 1995, <i>After Authoritarianism: Democracy or Disorder?</i> Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1 – 13.	‘What distinguishes modern democratic systems both from nondemocratic regimes, and also from premodern democracies and republics is a distinctive constellation of political institutions that effectively (and not just nominally) exist within a country. These include the selection of top officials in free and fair elections, extensive freedom of expression, wide access to alternative and independent sources of information, rights to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including political parties entitled to compete in elections, and an inclusive electorate. Note that it is the simultaneous presence of all these institutions that makes modern democratic governments so distinctive.’ p.4	Frequently quoted across authoritarianism literature.
Larry Diamond, 1996, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’ <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 7, no. 3, pp. 20- 35	‘Minimalist definitions descend from Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” 3 Huntington, among others, explicitly embraces Schumpeter’s emphasis on electoral competition as the essence of democracy. 4 Over time, however, Schumpeter’s appealingly concise definition has required periodic elaboration (or what Collier and Levitsky call “precising”) to avoid inclusion of cases that do not fit the implicit meaning. The most influential elaboration has been Robert Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy,” which requires not only extensive political competition and participation but also substantial levels of freedom (of speech, press, and the like) and pluralism that enable people to form and express their political preferences in a meaningful way.’ P. 21	Useful overview of different views of democracy, and the way the concept has been treated in the literature.
Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, <i>The American Political Science Review</i> , 53, no. 1, pp. 69-105.	‘democracy (in a complex society) is defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office. In large measure abstracted from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber,5 this definition implies a number of specific conditions: (a) a "political formula," a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions-parties, a free press, and so forth-which are legitimized, i.e., accepted as proper by all; (b) one set of	A key author in democracy literature

	political leaders in office; and (c) one or more sets of leaders, out of office, who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office.’ P. 71	
Samuel P. Huntington, 1997, ‘After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave’, <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 8, no. 4, pp. 3-12.	‘Let us briefly look at the record. The first, long wave of democratization that began in the early nineteenth century led to the triumph of democracy in some 30 countries by 1920. Renewed authoritarianism and the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s reduced the number of democracies in the world to about a dozen by 1942. The second, short wave of democratization after the Second World War again increased the number of democracies in the world to somewhat over 30, but this too was followed by the collapse of democracy in many of these countries. The third wave of democratization that began in Portugal has seen democratization occur much faster and on a scale far surpassing that of the previous two waves. Two decades ago, less than 30 percent of the countries in the world were democratic; now more than 60 percent have governments produced by some form of open, fair, and competitive elections. A quarter-century ago, authoritarian governments—communist politburos, military juntas, personal dictatorships—were the rule. Today, hundreds of millions of people who previously suffered under tyrants live in freedom. In addition, since democracies historically have not warred with other democracies, there has been a major expansion of the zone of peace in the world and a reduction in the likelihood of interstate conflict. This dramatic growth of democracy in such a short time is, without doubt, one of the most spectacular and important political changes in human history. But what about the future? Will democracy become consolidated in the countries where it has recently emerged? Will more countries become democratic? Are we about to see a world in which democracy is not only the predominant system of government but the universal system of government? ... The answers to these questions, I believe, depend largely on two factors: economic development and the receptivity to democracy of non-Western cultures.’ P. 3-4	Presents ideas that many works on authoritarianism build off.

Further reading items:

- Samuel P. Huntington, 1991, Democracy's Third Wave, *Journal of Democracy*, 2, no. 2, pp. 12-34.
- Marc F. Plattner, Larry Jay Diamond, 2007, ‘The Democracy Barometers (Part I)’, *Journal of Democracy*, 18, no. 3, p.65
- Larry Diamond, 2015, ‘Facing Up to the Democratic Recession’, *Journal of Democracy*, 26, no. 1, pp. 141-155.
- Thomas Carothers, ‘A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy’, *Journal of Democracy*, 18, no. 4, pp. 112-126.
- Larry Diamond, 2010, Why Are There No Arab Democracies?, *Journal of Democracy*, 21, no. 1, pp. 93-112.
- Bruce E. Moon, ‘Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq’, *Journal of Democracy*, 33, no. 4, pp. 115-148.
- David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 1997, ‘Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research’, *World Politics*, 49, no. 3, pp. 430-451.

Challenges to mainstream authoritarianism scholarship

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information
<p>Marlies Glasius, 2018, 'What authoritarianism is ... and is not: a practice perspective', <i>International Affairs</i>, 94, no. 3, pp. 515-533.</p>	<p>Mainstream studies only look at regime type and structures when determining whether they are authoritarian, but a broader perspective should include practices (some of Trump's acts may be judged as being authoritarian, even if the regime itself is not):</p> <p>'The first is that authoritarianism is in fact a negative category without a definition of its own. The second is an excessive focus on elections, at a time when the relationship between voting in elections and actual influence on policy-making is widely doubted by citizens and political scientists alike. The third is the assumption that authoritarianism is a structural phenomenon located only at the level of the nation-state.' P. 518</p> <p>'I will define authoritarian practices as patterns of action that sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts control, or their representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice. These are distinct from illiberal practices, which refer to patterned and organized infringements of individual autonomy and dignity. Although the two kinds of practice often go together in political life, the difference lies in the type of harm effected: authoritarian practices primarily constitute a threat to democratic processes, while illiberal practices are primarily a human rights problem.' P. 517</p>	<p>'We currently lack the tools to distinguish between tangible threats to democracy and interpretations imbued by left-liberal prejudice, because we have failed to define or operationalize 'authoritarianism' or 'illiberalism' in ways that relate to the common sense meanings journalists and citizens are freely using. We should be able to judge the 'authoritarianism' of governments not solely by how they came to power, or by the supposed personality traits of the electorate, but also by what they do once they are in power.' P. 515-6</p>
<p>Thomas Carothers, 2002, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 1, pp. 5-21.</p>	<p>Transitions paradigm is no longer relevant: (a good work to cite)</p> <p>'The transition paradigm has been somewhat useful during a time of momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world. But it is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model. Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling "transitional" are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the model. Sticking with the paradigm beyond its useful life is retarding evolution in the field of democratic assistance and is leading policy makers astray in other ways. It is time to recognize that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens.' P. 6</p> <p>See also: Marc F. Plattner, 'The End of the Transitions Era?' <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 25, no. 3, pp. 5-16.</p>	<p>'The transition paradigm was a product of a certain time—the heady early days of the third wave—and that time has now passed. It is necessary for democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates, and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change—one suited to the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era. P. 20</p>
<p>Matthijs Bogaards (2009) How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism,</p>	<p>Criticising the over abundance of types of regime in democratisation studies, focusing on electoral authoritarianism and defective democracy and calling for new understandings:</p> <p>'During the 1990s, it looked as if studies of democracy and democratization would be dominated by the embryonic disciplines of transitology and consolidology for the foreseeable future.¹⁰¹ In the new millennium the outlook has changed. The studies reviewed here agree that defective democracies and</p>	<p>Not directly relevant, but maybe a further reading item on trying to form unified theory on regime types.</p>

<p><i>Democratization</i>, 16:2, 399-423</p>	<p>electoral authoritarianism are not transitional phases, but regime types. All regard democratic consolidation as a distant prospect of marginal relevance to contemporary analysis, and when describing democratization, emphasize its partial character, culminating more often than not in defective democracies or even electoral authoritarian regimes. Some of the issues covered in the consolidation literature are recurring in the examination of democratic defects, but the research question is bound to change from 'how do new democracies consolidate and what factors facilitate this process?' to 'how do democratic defects develop and what are the prospects and possibilities for further democratization?' pp. 415-16.</p>	
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Literature using or formulating specific typologies

Hybrid regimes (electoral/competitive authoritarianism)

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Leah Gilbert, Payam Mohseni, 2011, 'Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes', <i>Studies in Comparative International Development</i>, 46, no. , pp. 270-297</p>	<p>'The shift from democracy with adjectives to authoritarianism with adjectives, rather than resolving the conceptual difficulties of regime classification, displaced the site of contestation from one position to another. While the source of conceptual confusion was initially based on the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, today confusion instead stems from the blurred boundary between authoritarian and non-authoritarian ones. This paper attempts to engage in the discussion and conceptualization of hybrid regimes beyond the framework of authoritarianism. Accordingly, we advocate the use of the term "hybrid regime" for nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes instead of the use of democratic or authoritarian labels.' P. 271</p>	<p>A useful overview of literature on hybrid regimes.</p>	<p>Lack of clarity around regime typologies.</p> <p>'As a result, this paper makes four main contributions to the field of regime theory. First, it reduces the conceptual confusion present in the classification of regimes by better theorizing the relationship of regime types to one another across multiple levels. Second, it revives a multi-dimensional and configurative method for conceptualizing regimes. Consequently, more attention is placed on a variety of institutional features that distinguish regimes from one another rather than the more common underlying dimension of competitiveness. Third, our multi-dimensional method sheds light on possible ways for conducting comparisons across regimes based on their cross-cutting institutional properties, opening new avenues for future empirical research. Finally, this paper provides innovative visual depictions of regime relationships, allowing for the clarification of abstract theoretical discussions.' P. 272</p>	<p>Theoretical (but classifies 100s of regimes 1990-2009)</p>


<p>Paul J. Carnegie, 2010, <i>The Road from Authoritarianism to Democratization in Indonesia</i>. New York: Palgrave Macmillan</p>	<p>Hybrid regimes:</p> <p>‘These countries may hold elections, but overall they simply lack many of the features that collectively define democracy. Often citizens have no real means of holding political elites to account beyond elections. They lack a sufficiently free press or the free associational autonomy to challenge malfeasance when it occurs. At the same time, an independent judiciary is usually a remote possibility that makes the rule of law an ineffective check. As a result, personalized interests go unchecked as the driving force behind the persistence of the hybrid regime with informal patronage networks and clientelistic structures running in parallel with formal institutions and high levels of corruption.’ P. 34</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Studies democratisation of Indonesia and seeks to go beyond simple explanations:</p> <p>‘[A] major lesson from the Indonesian experience is that ambiguity is to democratization what push is to shove. Yet, merely to state this raises difficult questions of interpretation. For a start, democratization does not derive exclusively from a free play of unconstrained political action. There are complex local terrains with multiple conditioning factors to consider, all of which affect decisions and strategies of change in different ways. This leaves us asking how to map what is essentially a complex interplay between context and agency.’ P. 140</p>	<p>Indonesia post-Suharto. Mixed methods.</p>
<p>Marc Morje’ Howard, Philip G. Roessler’ 2006, ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’, <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 50, no. 2, pp. 365-381.</p>	<p>‘Competitive authoritarian regimes include rules of the game that are accepted and stable, whereby both sides agree that elections—however flawed in practice—are the primary means of obtaining or maintaining political power. Moreover, these elections are competitive, generating a real struggle between the incumbent and opposition, which can sometimes lead to unpredictable or uncertain outcomes. Although the process is certainly unfair, since the ruling party relies on fraud, coercion, and patronage to try to win the election, the opposition still has an opportunity to defeat the incumbent, and thereby potentially to open the door for significant political liberalization. In this sense, competitive authoritarianism can be viewed as a residual category—neither</p>	<p>‘Competitive authoritarianism is inherently contradictory. Legitimate procedures (i.e., regular, competitive elections) are undermined by illegitimate practices such as vote rigging, violent disenfranchisement, and media bias. These inherent tensions simultaneously raise and frustrate the expectations of the opposition, civil society, and the population (and even moderates and reformers within the incumbent regimes) that a more liberal order is possible. Thus, the opposition identifies the incumbent as the key obstacle to a more democratic system of governance and—unlike in hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes—since the institutions for change already exist, victory is more likely to be perceived as being within reach. Unless the</p>	<p>Why elections in regimes sometimes lead to liberalisation, and sometimes do not.</p>	<p>50 elections worldwide, 1990-2002, comparative analysis.</p>

liberal or electoral democracy nor closed or hegemonic authoritarianism—which suggests that it is inherently unstable, and thus can “tip” in one direction or another (Levitsky and Way 2002, 59). P. 368

A useful overview of different regimes in the figure below:

incumbent drastically alters the rules of the game, reverting to hegemonic or closed authoritarianism, change is possible. And, in fact, electoral “upsets” do sometimes take place, where the dominant party (or candidate) sometimes loses despite the considerable advantages it had enjoyed.’ P. 369

FIGURE 1 Disaggregation of Political Regimes by Various Dimensions of Democracy



Note: “Elections” refers to national elections for the direct selection of authoritative executive leaders or for a parliament that selects authoritative executive leaders.

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, 2005, 'International Linkage and Democratization', <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 16, no. 3, pp. 20-34.</p>	<p>Competitive authoritarianism: 'These are civilian regimes in which democratic institutions exist and permit meaningful competition for power, but where the political playing field is so heavily tilted in favor of incumbents that the regime cannot be labeled democratic.³ Many of these regimes were initially viewed as "in transition" to democracy; this, it has become clear, was not the case.' P. 20</p>	<p>' The coexistence of autocratic governments and formal democratic institutions in these regimes is an obvious potential source of instability. The existence of formally empowered legislatures and courts, independent media outlets, and meaningful (if flawed) elections allows opposition forces periodically to pose serious challenges to authoritarian governments. These challenges present incumbents with a difficult dilemma: On the one hand, overt repression—canceling elections, jailing opponents, ignoring supreme court rulings, or closing the legislature—is damaging to the regime's reputation, because the challenges are formally legal and internationally legitimate; on the other hand, if opposition challenges are allowed to run their course, incumbents run the risk of losing power. Hence, competitive authoritarian governments must choose between allowing serious opposition challenges to proceed, at the cost of possible defeat, and egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost of potential international isolation.' P. 26</p>	<p>Studying the relationship between regime ties to democratic international partners, and the likelihood of democratisation in them. Conclusion: where linkages are higher, democratisation is more likely.</p>	<p>Global, loose method.</p>
<p>Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, 2010, <i>Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War</i>. New York: Cambridge University Press.</p>	<p>'Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power ... What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field.' P. 7</p>	<p>This work has a strong theoretical section that could prove useful, since it contrasts different types of authoritarian regimes: 'Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic</p>	<p>Explanation of rise and fall of 'competitive authoritarian' regimes since the Cold-War. Why did some democratize, and others did not? Conclusion: 'two main factors: ties to the West and the strength of governing-party and state organizations. Where linkage to the West was high, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents'</p>	<p>Comparative analysis of 35 countries in Asia, Africa, Americas and Eurasia since 1990.</p>

		institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair' p. 5	organizational power. Where state and governing party structures were well organized and cohesive, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; where they were underdeveloped or lacked cohesion, regimes were unstable, although they rarely democratized.' P. 2	
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 2002, 'Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 13, no. 2, pp. 51-65.	Transitions literature suffers from a 'democratizing bias' (p. 51). 'In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy ... Although scholars have characterized many of these regimes as partial or "diminished" forms of democracy, we agree with Juan Linz that they may be better described as a (diminished) form of Authoritarianism.' P. 52	Competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from democracy on the one hand and full-scale authoritarianism on the other. Modern democratic regimes all meet four minimum criteria: 1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders. Although even fully democratic regimes may at times violate one or more of these criteria, such violations are not broad or systematic enough to seriously impede democratic challenges to incumbent governments. In other words, they do not fundamentally alter the playing field between government and opposition. In competitive authoritarian regimes, by contrast, violations of these criteria are both frequent enough and serious enough to create an uneven playing field between government and opposition.' P. 53	Presents a new conceptualization of hybrid regimes.	No dedicated empirical section.
Ellen Lust-Okar (2006) 'Elections under authoritarianism: Preliminary lessons	In electoral authoritarian regimes: 'The limited space for policy making in authoritarian regimes means that elections are more frequently contests over access to	A strong literature review section that is worth looking at. Implications for democracy promotion:	Understanding the role of elections in ME authoritarian regimes. 'A closer look at elections in the MENA finds that political elites	Jordan, 1997 and 2003 election data.

<p>from Jordan,' <i>Democratization</i>, 13:3, 456-471</p>	<p>state resources than debates over policy. Voters recognize this, casting their ballots for those who can best deliver. Parliamentarians know this as well, seeking to meet constituents' needs rather than to undermine their relations with government. The result of such a situation is that parties are neutered, voters become cynical, and demands for democratization (as well as support for the forces intending to push for it) decline.' P. 468</p>	<p>'Indeed, the logic of authoritarian elections should lead us to question the value of pressing for, and applauding, the introduction of elections in authoritarian regimes. The excitement over the introduction of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, for instance, may be misplaced. Such elections are more likely to help sustain the authoritarian regime than they are to promote democracy. Indeed, if elections are to promote democracy, external pressure should be placed more on pressing for independent economic opportunities, expanding legislative powers, and reducing resources available to state elites in the centre of power.' P. 468</p>	<p>take the elections very seriously. Even where liberalization has been extremely limited or reversed, both incumbents and opponents vigorously debate rules governing participation. Candidates invest enormously in elections; even in the most seemingly repressive regimes, such as Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, candidates spend large amounts of time and money on everything from lavish banquets and gifts to campaign materials and votes. It is hard to imagine that such debates would exist if institutions were completely meaningless, or that candidates would invest so heavily in elections if the outcomes were predetermined. In short, a serious study of electoral politics under authoritarianism is required if we are to bridge the wide gap between our assumptions about elections under authoritarianism and the reality witnessed on the ground. Finally, there are important theoretical reasons to study authoritarian elections. Until we understand the politics of authoritarian elections and the institutions that govern them, we cannot distinguish elections that create momentum toward democratization from those which reinforce the existing regime.' P. 457</p>	
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Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Jason Brownlee, 2007, <i>Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization</i>. New York: Cambridge University Press.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>Elections are not mutually exclusive with authoritarianism: ‘The shift to authoritarianism with multiparty elections, then, does not represent an unwitting step toward full democratization, but neither do manipulated elections automatically protect rulers by reducing international pressure and corralling the opposition. Autocrats’ elections, I maintain, are best viewed as one of the later stages in a long political process that may lead either to durable authoritarianism or to opportunities for democratization. When elections deal surprise defeats to autocrats, they culminate opposition groups’ efforts to break the regime’s dominance. In this sense, election results in authoritarian contexts tend to ratify rather than redistribute the power that competing groups wield.’ P. 9</p>	<p>Understanding enduring authoritarian regimes and struggling democracies:</p> <p>‘The basic answer of this book is that institutional differences separate unstable regimes from durable dictatorships. The organizations structuring elite relations and decision making determine whether an autocrat’s coalition will fragment, thereby opening space for the opposition, or cohere, excluding rival movements in the process. As the book’s first epigraph from Machiavelli implies, undemocratic regimes are not inherently fragile; they weaken when their leaders drive dissatisfied elites into the opposition’s ranks. Preventing this from happening entails more than the individual authority of an especially charismatic, wilful, or ruthless dictator: It requires organizations, most commonly political parties, that dominate national affairs and regulate elite conflict.’ P. 2</p> <p>Conclusions on p. 202-03 are worth considering. In brief: ‘I have developed a historical-institutional explanation for the variation between durable authoritarianism and opportunities for democratization. In this account, the institutional legacies of early elite conflict are the parameters that circumscribe subsequent political actors’ contests for power. Weak organizational bonds and the</p>	<p>Comparative analysis of Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, using interviews with elites to study last 30-50 years.</p>

			corresponding defection of disgruntled elites are the wellspring of viable opposition alliances, although not the only determinant of their success.' P. 202	
Andreas Schedler, 2013, <i>The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism</i> . Oxford: Oxford University Press.	<p>'Electoral authoritarian regimes practice authoritarianism behind the institutional facades of representative democracy. They hold regular multiparty elections at the national level, yet violate liberal-democratic minimum standards in systematic and profound ways.' P. 1</p> <p>'I develop a theory of authoritarian elections which is grounded in a general theory of authoritarian politics. Both revolve around the politics of uncertainty.'</p> <p>'In electoral authoritarian regimes, governments deploy a broad repertoire of manipulative strategies to keep winning elections. They ban parties, prosecute candidates, harass journalists, intimidate voters, forge election results, and so forth. Their proximate goal is to contain the uncertainty of electoral outcomes, their ultimate goal to prevent the uncertainties of regime change.' P. 1</p>	<p>This text has a detailed theory section and is worth citing.</p> <p>See also:</p> <p>Andreas Schedler (ed.), 2006, <i>Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition</i>. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.</p> <p>Andreas Schedler, 2002, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation," <i>Journal of Democracy</i> 13/2 (April): 36-50</p>	<p>Studies opposition and government struggles in regimes.</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>'Authoritarian regimes suffer from institutional uncertainties: their hold on power is never secure. And they suffer from informational uncertainties: they can never know for sure how secure they are. Contending actors try to shape both: the actual threats rulers face as well as the perceptions of threat.' P. 14</p>	Comparative analysis of 200 elections in authoritarian regimes worldwide 1980-2002.
Toby Dodge, 2013, 'State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: the rise of a new authoritarianism', <i>International Affairs</i> , 89, no. 2, pp. 241-257.	'In a fully authoritarian system, opposition forces cannot legally and openly compete for power. Within competitive authoritarianism elections are regularly held, and their result is open to some doubt before the event. ²¹ However, the competitive authoritarian government increasingly shapes the electoral contest to its advantage. It does this by restricting civil liberties to limit the space for political mobilization and protest. It then uses the resources of the state, particularly finance, coercion and the media, to ensure that it retains a dominant electoral	N/A	Can democracy be imposed from outside? No, as the example of Iraq's enduring authoritarianism demonstrates.	Iraq, 2003-2012, loose method.

	<p>advantage. Although the results of elections are not entirely predictable in advance, the use of state-controlled repression and resources reduces the political space within which the opposition can operate. Iraq today much more closely resembles the competitive authoritarianism described by Levitsky and Way than it does the procedural democracy described by Robert Dahl.' P. 244</p>			
<p>Xavier Marquez, 2017, <i>Non-Democratic Politics: Authoritarianism, Dictatorship and Democratization</i>. London: Palgrave.</p>	<p>'Authoritarian regimes, unlike totalitarian regimes, do not come about through struggles over social control resulting in the triumph of one ideology enforced by a single party. Instead, several distinct and independent groups come to have a share of political power and influence over political decisions, but there are more or less sharp limits on which interests can be represented and on which organizations can take part in the political process (unlike in democracies).' P. 46</p>	<p>A lot of democratic theory.</p>	<p>Provides an overview of how non-democracies can stay in power through a range of different methods and according to different ruling structures.</p> <p>Over the last 200 years, non-democracies have shifted from totalitarianism, to authoritarian alleging to be moving towards democracy, and the current model of regimes 'mimicking democracy' to serve their purposes.</p>	<p>Global, theory-heavy.</p>
<p>Jason Brownlee, 2009, 'Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions', <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 53, no. 3, pp. 515-532.</p>	<p>No precise definition.</p>	<p>Provides a useful overview relevant literature and of different hybrid regimes (hegemonic, semi-authoritarian, etc.)</p>	<p>Testing 'propensity to change' from authoritarian regimes to democratic.</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>'[T]he main markers of electoral authoritarianism showed no substantial effect on the breakdown or maintenance of those regimes. Yet, in an intriguing turn for politics beyond the grey zone, competitive authoritarianism significantly increased the likelihood a successor government would be an electoral democracy. Elections have not provided</p>	<p>158 global regimes over 30 years. Large-N, uses Freedom House and Polity indices.</p>

			opponents an independent mechanism for ousting incumbents, but where the opposition is able to perform strongly, competitive elections augur well for chances the successor regime will meet the minimum standard for democratic governance.' P. 531	
Daniela Donno, 2013, 'Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes', <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> , 57, no. 3, pp. 703-716.	'[C]onsider the differences in electoral context across electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes: in hegemonic authoritarian regimes (HARs), the incumbent or ruling party enjoys overwhelming electoral dominance (conventionally understood as winning more than 70 or 75% of the vote or seat share); whereas in competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), opposition parties pose greater electoral challenges and garner a larger share of votes. P. 703	'The distinction between electoral authoritarianism and democracy hinges on the quality of electoral competition (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006, chap.1). EA regimes allow multiple parties to compete in elections, but they do so under patently unfair conditions. Incumbents may place barriers on opposition parties' ability to campaign; generate a progovernment media bias; stack electoral commissions and courts with their supporters; or resort to stuffing ballot boxes and manipulating vote tabulations. Among EA regimes, a further distinction can be made based on the degree to which the incumbent or ruling party is electorally dominant (Brownlee 2009, 518; Diamond 2002).' P. 704	When do authoritarian regimes transition to democracy? What effect do elections have on the transition?	177 elections from 1990-2007. Large-N, comparative, election results.

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Axel Hadenius, Jan Teorell, 2007, 'Pathways from Authoritarianism', <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 18, no. 1, pp. 143-157.</p>	<p>'At the core of our authoritarian regime typology is a distinction between three different modes of maintaining political power, probably the three most prevalent throughout history: 1) hereditary succession, or lineage; 2) the actual or threatened use of military force; and 3) popular election. These three modes of power maintenance correspond to three generic types of regime: monarchy, the military regime, and the electoral regime.' P. 146.</p>	<p>'Authoritarian regimes are heterogenous, diverse in both their resiliency and their tendency to democratize. As our analysis shows, limited multiparty authoritarian governments hold the greatest prospects for democratization; they are fragile, occupying the unstable middle of the spectrum from autocracy to democracy, and they are most likely to make a transition to democracy.' P. 154</p>	<p>Understanding hybrid regimes.</p> <p>Findings: monarchies tend to oscillate from pure monarchism to highly restricted forms of electoral monarchism. Second, pure one-party states exhibit a complex pattern of change. Third, military regimes transition most frequently to limited multiparty systems. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the majority of transitions from nondominant-party (that is, more competitive) limited multiparty regimes result in democracy. (see p. 152)</p>	<p>Large-N, global, 1970s-2000s.</p>
<p>Lucan Way, 2005, 'Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine', <i>World Politics</i>, Volume 57, Number 2, pp. 231-261</p>	<p>No precise definition.</p>	<p>'To understand the sources of regime development in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, it is necessary to examine not just the process of democratic institution building but also the factors that facilitate or undermine autocratic consolidation and regime closure. Approaching these countries as unconsolidated autocracies rather than as simply emerging democracies draws attention to key sources of political competition that have largely been ignored in the literature on competitive regimes. Thus, competitive politics were rooted much less in robust civil societies, strong democratic institutions, or democratic leadership than in <i>the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control</i> by preserving elite unity, controlling elections and media, and/or using force against opponents. The result has been what might be called "pluralism by default." P. 232</p>	<p>Understanding how countries become more closed politically over time. Challenge the transition model.</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>'focusing on the authoritarian end of the regime spectrum means much more than calling glasses half empty that others call half full. Attention to the sources of authoritarianism draws our attention to a whole range of issues—including mechanisms of repression and elite unity to an autocrat or party—that have received scant attention in a literature focused overwhelmingly on the prerequisites for democratic rule. By itself, incumbent failure is unlikely to create democracy. Yet it has often generated important</p>	<p>Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine post-Cold War. Small-n study of secondary sources.</p>

			openings for political competition in the post-cold war era.' P. 261	
Steven Levitsky & James Loxton (2013) 'Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes,' <i>Democratization</i> , 20:1, 107-136	'Competitive authoritarian regimes are hybrid regimes in which formal democratic institutions are viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbent abuse skews the playing field to such an extent that the opposition's ability to compete is seriously compromised. ⁴ Such regimes are competitive in that opposition forces use elections to contest seriously (and on occasion, successfully) for power. Yet competition is markedly unfair. Incumbents politicize state institutions – such as the judiciary, security forces, tax agencies, and electoral authorities – and deploy them against opponents.' P. 108	'Two factors may be considered permissive conditions for competitive authoritarianism. The first is institutional weakness. Competitive authoritarianism is most likely to emerge in a context of weak state and democratic institutions, where constitutional rules are unstable or contested, judiciaries lack independence, and state agencies are highly politicized. Second, competitive authoritarianism is more likely to emerge where political parties are weak. Party system collapse facilitates the emergence of personalistic outsiders, who, unencumbered by party structures, take advantage of weak oppositions to concentrate power. ¹² Yet weak democratic institutions and party system collapse are by themselves insufficient in explaining the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Not all democracies with weak institutions and parties decay into competitive authoritarianism. Some additional factor must trigger such transitions; that trigger, we argue, is populism.' P. 110	Explaining emergence of competitive authoritarianism in South America: 'the primary catalyst behind competitive authoritarian emergence in contemporary Latin America is populism, or the election of personalistic outsiders who mobilize mass constituencies via anti-establishment appeals. Although populism is commonly viewed as a threat to liberal democracy, ³ the causal mechanisms linking populism to democratic breakdown remain poorly understood. We argue that populist governments push weak democracies into competitive authoritarianism for at least three reasons. First, populists are political outsiders who lack experience with institutions of representative democracy. Second, due to the anti-establishment nature of their appeal, successful populists earn an electoral mandate to bury the existing elite and its institutions. Third, populist presidents usually confront institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by established parties. Lacking experience, facing hostile legislatures and courts, and armed with a mandate to depose the old elite, newly elected populists often assault institutions of horizontal accountability, triggering a constitutional crisis. Presidents who prevail in these showdowns gain	Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 1990-2010. 14 elections. Uses election data to make comparisons.

			unchecked control over state institutions,' p. 108	
Larry Jay Diamond, 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 13, no. 2, pp. 21-35.	'the distinction between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism turns crucially on the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections. Often particularly difficult are judgments about whether elections have been free and fair, both in the ability of opposition parties and candidates to campaign and in the casting and counting of the votes. Hence the frequency with which the validations by international observer missions of elections in ambiguous or electoral authoritarian regimes are, often convincingly, criticized as superficial, premature, and politically driven.' P. 28	A useful overview of literature on different regime types to date.	How to classify regimes that appear authoritarian, and yet hold elections.	Global, quite theoretical, election data, democracy index polls.
Andreas Schedler, 2002, 'The Menu of Manipulation', <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 13, no. 2, pp. 36-50.	'Electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty. Balancing between electoral control and electoral credibility, they situate themselves in a nebulous zone of structural ambivalence.' P. 36-7	'The distinction between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism builds upon the common affirmation that democracy requires elections, but not just any kind of elections. The idea of democratic self government is incompatible with electoral farces. In the common phrasing, elections must be "free and fair" in order to pass as democratic. Under electoral democracy, contests comply with minimal democratic norms; under electoral authoritarianism, they do not.' P. 38	Classifying regimes. 'But when are authoritarian elections regime-sustaining and when are they regime-subverting? What makes them now instruments of power, now levers for the opposition? Why do they sometimes keep authoritarian rulers in the saddle, and at other times lift them right out of their stirrups? To a large extent, it is the strategic interaction between authoritarian incumbents and the democratic opposition that determines how the structural ambiguity of electoral autocracies plays out. Yet the ultimate arbiters of the game are the military and the citizenry. The former have the power to abort it by force, the latter to subvert it through their votes. At times, the	Global, quite theoretical, election data, democracy index polls.

			international community also may tip the balance.’ P. 49	
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Neopatrimonial regimes

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Jason Brownlee, 2002, ‘...And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes’, <i>Studies in Comparative International Development</i>, 37, no. 3, pp. 35-63.</p>	<p>‘neopatrimonial regimes—those in which the leader treats the state as his private fiefdom and gives only rhetorical attention to formal political institutions’ p. 37</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Explaining how occurrences that seem to threaten regime survival do not result in regime change.</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>‘Examining crises survived by four neopatrimonial regimes, I have illustrated the conceptual importance of such “non-transitions” for the comparative study of regime change. Hard-liners in neopatrimonial regimes are tenacious when challenged, drawing upon militaries tied by personal connections. Further, neopatrimonial control proves resilient when incumbent elites can crush internal revolts. In Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia, when we might have expected anti-authoritarian insurgencies to yield regime breakdown and transition, they instead produced neopatrimonial continuity. The endurance of these regimes illustrates the capacity of authoritarian incumbents, when unconstrained by foreign patrons opposing the use of repression, to stop opposition movements working for change.’ P. 57</p>	<p>Syria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia. 1970s-1980s. Loose method.</p>

Bureaucratic authoritarianism

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>David Collier, 2001, 'Bureaucratic Authoritarianism', in Joel Krieger (editor), <i>The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World</i>, 2nd ed, pp. 93-95</p>	<p>Summary: 'Bureaucratic authoritarianism has thus been understood as a form of bureaucratic and technocratic military rule that seeks to curtail popular mobilization and is built on a political coalition and a policy orientation that entails strong ties to international economic actors ... As a subtype of authoritarian rule, it may be distinguished from other subtypes: populist authoritarianism, which promotes popular mobilization rather than demobilization; and traditional authoritarianism, which is found prior to any extensive popular mobilization. P. 94</p>	<p>'Bureaucratic authoritarianism is a type of military rule often interpreted as novel in relation to the earlier history of Latin America. It was generally led by the military as an institution, in contrast to the personalistic rule of individual officers. Rotation in the presidency among military leaders was a common though not universal, trait. This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private organizations, including international agencies and transnational corporations. Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly technocratic. This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in the region. Repression was unleashed against the labour movement, political parties associated with labour, and other social sectors whose prior mobilization had seemed to threaten the existing political and economic system' p. 93</p>	<p>Encyclopedia entry.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<p>Guillermo A. O'Donnell, 1988, <i>Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective</i>. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Translated James McGuire and Rae Flory)</p>	<p>Bureaucratic authoritarianism: 'It is, primarily and fundamentally, the aspect of global society that guarantees and organizes the domination exercised through a class structure subordinated to the upper fractions of a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie. In other words, the principal social based of the BA is this upper bourgeoisie.' P. 31</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Studying Argentine regime 1966-73 and the way it organised society and politics through bureaucratic structures.</p>	<p>1966-73 regime in Argentina. Loose method, interviews with elites.</p>
<p>Foundational text (not available):</p> <p>Guillermo A. O'Donnell, <i>Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics</i>, Politics of Modernization Series No. 9 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973</p>	<p>No access.</p>	<p>For an overview, see:</p> <p>Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, 1982, 'Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited' <i>Latin American Research Review</i>, 17, no. 2, pp. 3-40.</p> <p>'O'Donnell argued that social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy. His analysis focused on the emergence of military regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the middle 1960s-regimes that he labelled "bureaucratic- authoritarian" to distinguish them from oligarchical and populist forms of authoritarian rule found in less modernized countries' p. 3</p>	<p>No access.</p>	<p>No access.</p>

Populist authoritarianism

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>Wenfang Tang, 2016, <i>Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability</i> New York: Oxford University Press</p>	<p>Proposes Populist Authoritarianism (PA) as a model for understanding China, in contrast to elite or bureaucratic authoritarianism.</p> <p>‘I develop a preliminary theory of populist authoritarianism, which includes the following elements: the Mass Line ideology, strong interpersonal trust and rich social capital, individual political activism and political contention, weak political institutions and an underdeveloped civic society, an often paranoid and highly responsive government, and strong regime support.’ P. 2</p>	<p>Mass Line: ‘three key components: (1) a direct link between the state and society with minimum interference of intermediate organizations and institutions, (2) a thorough mobilization of the masses in political participation, and (3) an implicit concept of social contract in which the elites serve the interest of the masses who in return grant political support for the state. As is shown later in this chapter, the Mass Line continues to serve as a linkage between the state and society in the post-Mao Chinese political culture and a powerful instrument for political mobilization and regime legitimacy.’ P. 8-9</p>	<p>Tang studies how in China strong political participation can co-exist with authoritarian governance. This is explained by the lack of an independent civil society and the popularity of the Communist Party. A politically involved populace operates within civil society organisations co-opted by the state.</p>	<p>Large-N surveys on public opinion towards Communist Party, national identity, public trust.</p> <p>Several comparative chapters contrasting survey data from China and countries like democratic Taiwan.</p>
<p>Gino Germani, 1978 <i>Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism</i>. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.</p>	<p>Modern vs. classical/traditional authoritarianism:</p> <p>‘What is essential in modern authoritarianism, above all in its “pure” form (totalitarianism proper), is that the aim of this planned socialization and resocialization is the transformation of the population into ideologically “militant,” active participants. This derives from the fact that the modern industrial structure, in its several</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Compares fascism of 1930-40s Italy with Peronism of Argentina in 40-50s using ideas drawn from social mobilization theory to demonstrate the role of modernity in authoritarianism.</p>	<p>Italy, Argentina, 1930s-50s. Loose method.</p>

	<p>varieties, requires a level of active participation of all the inhabitants of a country.' P. 9</p> <p>'Modern authoritarianism in its pure form does not reduce individuals to passive subjects; in a sense, it wants them to be citizens. Its aim is not depoliticization (though this may occur), but politicization according to a certain specific ideology. The citizens have political opinions rather than beliefs.' P. 10</p>			
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Empirical literature with little theoretical engagement

Most of the works below do not go into great detail defining precisely what ‘authoritarianism’ means. Rather, they proceed in two ways: Firstly, they either take as common knowledge what ‘authoritarianism’ actually means, and they explore empirical material. Or, secondly, they define it based on what it isn’t: democracy. That is, they go into detail talking about the markers of democracies, and countries that do not fit their definition of democracy, are by default authoritarian.

Also, there are a number of works below which are only marginally relevant to the project. They’ve been included to put as ‘further reading’ items for footnotes (especially some of the newer works).

Asia

Author/Study	Defining Authoritarianism		Application of the Concept	
	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Teresa Wright, 2010, <i>Accepting Authoritarianism: state-society relations in China’s reform era</i> . Stanford: Stanford University Press	No precise definition given.	N/A	Considers how China can prosper economically but not become less authoritarian (good review on pp. 22 – 24). Conclusion: ‘China’s combination of state- led development policies, market forces associated with late industrialization, and socialist legacies has given most Chinese citizens good reason to accept the authoritarian political status quo.’ P. 162	China, 1970s’ reforms onwards. Surveys, polling data of different societal spheres (workers, farmers, elites).
Yichen Guan (2018) Demand for democracy in resilient authoritarianism: evidence from rural China, <i>Democratization</i> , 25:7	No precise definition given.	N/A	Exploring the sources of public demand for democracy under authoritarianism. Conclusion: ‘This study finds some evidence for institutional theory, which argues that responsive and adaptive authoritarian rule and dependence on the regime reduce one’s demand for democratic development. Dependence on the regime is found to reduce one’s demand for democratic development, whereas attitudes towards government performance turns out not to be relevant to explaining the case of rural China. Specifically, employees in the government system,	China, large-N analysis, survey data 2012-14.

			such as local cadres and civil servants working in government agencies, in general have less demand for free elections compared to people working in non-government sectors. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership, however, does not have a significant impact on individual demand for democracy.' P. 1074	
Eva Pils, 2018, <i>Human Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism</i> . Cambridge: Polity Press.	No detailed definition given.	Only marginally relevant; focuses on human rights. Included as a 'further reading' item for footnotes.	Studies human rights policy and practices in China, and finds that they are deteriorating as China becomes more authoritarian under Xi Jinping.	China. Mixed methods.
Morgenbesser, Lee, 2016, <i>Behind the Facade: Elections Under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia</i> . Albany: State University of New York Press.	'The most salient characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the power of dictators. Despite appearances, however, their authority is always conditional on the behavior of political elites, citizens, and to a lesser extent, the opposition. The strategic interaction that occurs between the dictator and these actors is notoriously fractious. Can he guarantee that all his orders will be fully executed by political elites, including those who oversee the repressive apparatus? Can he exercise sufficient control over citizens? Can he contain the opposition in ways that do not unexpectedly raise the costs of repression and lower the costs of toleration? Since dictators lack the capacity to resolve these issues, another characteristic of their stay in power is paranoia.' P. 19	'The book speaks to a broader narrative about the persistence of authoritarian rule around the world today. During the third wave of democratization, Huntington (1991: 174) had confidently declared that "elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also the death of dictatorship." This optimistic view derived from the idea that multiparty elections were anathema to authoritarian regimes, because they encouraged unwanted participation and pluralization. It was also owing to a series of stunning opposition party victories in such places as Chile (1988), Poland (1989), and Nicaragua (1990). Today, such optimism would be misplaced, because most authoritarian regimes have proven to be adept at masking their rule behind democratic artifice.' P. 7	Considers why elections and authoritarian regimes are not mutually exclusive: 'To unravel this paradox, this book accounts for why authoritarian regimes hold elections. In doing so, it sheds new light on the logic of contemporary authoritarianism, including how a nominally democratic institution contributes to the survival of dictators and the political elites surrounding them. The book advances an original theoretical framework for elections in authoritarian regimes: information, legitimation, management, and neopatrimonialism.' P. 2 Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework for understanding why regimes permit elections. It goes against 'classical' approaches which saw elections as the antithesis of authoritarian regimes.	Cambodia, Myanmar, Singapore 70s onwards. Mixed methods (polling, election data, interviews, secondary sources, etc.)
Simon Springer, 2010, <i>Cambodia's Neoliberal</i>	No precise definition given.	Only marginally relevant; a further reading item on neoliberalism.	Neoliberalism helping regimes to endure:	Cambodia, mixed methods.

<p><i>Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public Space</i>. New York: Routledge.</p>			<p>‘The realities of Cambodian political life are far from democratic, open, fair, and just. Not only has neoliberalization done little to change this situation, but such political economic reform has actually exacerbated conditions of authoritarianism in Cambodia. Accordingly, neoliberalization is conceived as effectively acting to suffocate an indigenous burgeoning of democratic politics.’ P. 5</p>	
<p>Lei, Ya-Wen, 2018, <i>The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China</i>. Princeton: Princeton University Press.</p>	<p>‘Authoritarian states, by definition, undermine civil society—the basis on which the public sphere is built—thus conventional wisdom tells us that the conditions for political life and a public sphere in such contexts are likely to be quite bleak and suffocating (Habermas 1996, 369). Yet, when I looked at what was going on in China, I saw lively political discussion, contention, and engagement—in short, the emergence of a vibrant public sphere, against all apparent odds.’ P. 2</p>	<p>Marginally relevant.</p>	<p>China’s modernisation programs have inadvertently empowered anti-authoritarian tendencies by giving space for a public sphere: ‘authoritarian dilemma of modernization’ p. 6.</p> <p>‘I argue that the fragmentation of the Chinese state opened a space for various actors to form overlapping social networks and to use the law and the media for contention. This argument builds on the fragmented authoritarianism model of Chinese politics. Instead of seeing the state as a monolithic entity, the fragmented authoritarianism model notes that government agencies across levels and localities may have different interests and political goals.’ P. 10</p>	<p>China. Textual analysis, surveys, interviews.</p>
<p>Carl Minzner, 2018, <i>End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise</i>. New York: Oxford University Press.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>Marginally relevant.</p>	<p>Authoritarianism is increasing, with adverse effects for civil society and democracy.</p>	<p>China, from reform era to Xi Jinping, mixed methods.</p>
<p>Jinghan Zeng, 2016, ‘China’s date with big data: will it strengthen or threaten authoritarian rule?’ <i>International Affairs</i>, 92, no. 6, pp. 1443-1462.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>‘The advent of the big data era has complicated authoritarian governance, for big data is a double-edged sword which has enormous potential to improve public service or threaten civil liberty, depending on the political context within which it is deployed.’ P. 1461</p>	<p>The impact that big data may have on authoritarian resilience.</p>	<p>China, recent decades, loose method.</p>

Middle East/North Africa

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
<p>J. Karakoç Bakis, Jülide Karakoç (Editors) 2015. <i>Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and after the Arab Uprisings</i>. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>Note: edited collection.</p>	<p>Looks at ‘roots of authoritarianism’ across the Middle East. Chapter 1, p. 9 – 13 has a good lit review on definitions of authoritarianism (the sources it cites are included in this document).</p> <p>‘The Middle East has historically been the least free region in the world. Why are Middle Eastern countries resistant to democratization, or why do authoritarian regimes take root in this region? ... Marsha Pripstein Posusney (2005, p. 3) outlines two major approaches within the political science literature on authoritarianism and democratization: “The ‘prerequisites’ school, whose arguments posit economic, cultural, or institutional necessities for transitions from authoritarianism to begin; and the ‘transitions’ paradigm, which sees democratization as a contingent choice of regime and opposition actors that can occur under a variety of socioeconomic and cultural conditions.” p. 31</p> <p>(From chapter 1: Selin M. Bölme ‘The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East’, pp. 7-37)</p>	<p>Numerous countries, mixed methods.</p>
<p>Koenraad Bogaert, 2018, <i>Globalized Authoritarianism: Megaprojects, Slums, and Class Relations in Urban Morocco</i>, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Bogaert considers how neoliberal social/economic policies can exist with and even strengthen authoritarian regimes, in this case, in Morocco.</p> <p>‘I argue that the reforms and projects implemented in Morocco over the past few decades should not be understood as some kind of gradual democratization or liberalization but rather as examples of how authoritarian government converges with increasing globalization and transforms through its interaction with a rationale of economic liberalization’ p. 9</p>	<p>Morocco, 1980s-2000s. Looks at capitalist projects in large cities. No clear method (mostly narratival: comments on particular policies).</p>

			<p>‘As a result, authoritarianism in Morocco has been transformed by the ways in which the interests of ruling domestic elites and (global) economic elites increasingly intertwine. This gives rise to new arrangements where “market requirements” define and justify the (authoritarian) mode of government. Consequently, the making of a new political world in Morocco, and the Arab region more generally, has been determined not only by “the regime” or by domestic state–society relations but also, and increasingly, by interests and interventions related to global capitalism. In other words, authoritarian government in Morocco has become, in many ways, a more globalized affair’ p. 16</p> <p>‘A neoliberal governmentality might be perfectly compatible with authoritarian political systems because it promotes a very narrow conception of freedom.’ P. 181</p>	
<p>Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Editors), 2013, <i>Middle East Authoritarianisms : Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran</i>. Stanford: Stanford University Press.</p>	<p>‘[W]e define regimes in Syria and Iran in terms of what we call <i>recombinant authoritarianism</i>: systems of rule that possess the capacity to reorder and reconfigure instruments and strategies of governance, to reshape and recombine existing institutional, discursive, and regulatory arrangements to create recognizable but nonetheless distinctive solutions to shifting configurations of challenges’ (Stark 1996) p. 7</p>	<p>Note: edited collection.</p>	<p>Studies how regimes remain in power by adapting to changes.</p> <p>‘First, our focus in this volume is not on the <i>persistence</i> of authoritarian regimes in Syria and Iran—a theme many of the authors have addressed in previous work—but their <i>resilience</i> ... Authoritarian persistence carries connotations of anachronistic, one-person dictatorships stubbornly clinging to power while falling increasingly out of touch with their societies and rapidly changing environments ... By contrast, authoritarian resilience refers to the attributes, relational qualities, and institutional arrangements that have long given regimes in the Middle East, conceptualized as <i>institutionalized systems of rule</i>, the capacity to adapt governance strategies to changing domestic and international conditions. If questions of persistence draw our attention to explanations of <i>outcomes</i>, questions of resilience shift our focus to explanations of <i>processes</i> and in particular to the dynamic and complex interconnections between processes of authoritarian’ p. 5</p>	<p>Syria and Iran: compares both systems at a range of levels, including protest, governance, and religion. Post-9/11.</p>

			(From chapter 1: Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, <i>Authoritarian governance in Syria and Iran: Challenged, Reconfiguring, and Resilient</i> , pp. 1-31.	
Schlumberger, Oliver (Editor), 2007, <i>Debating Arab Authoritarianism : Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes</i> . Stanford: Stanford University Press.	No precise definition given.	Note: edited collection.	Why do ME authoritarian regimes endure? ‘In brief, the two questions could thus be captured as (i) what accounts for the durability of nondemocratic rule in Arab countries? and (2) what are the dynamics that characterize political developments in Arab polities and how can they be grasped analytically?’ p. 6-7	Egypt, Saudi, Morocco, mixed methods.
Noureddine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia, and Mimi Kirk (Editors), 2014, <i>Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis</i> . New York: Routledge.	Differentiates between totalitarianism and authoritarianism: the former crushes all resistance and takes full control of society. The latter cannot exert as much control, and have to use existing structures to stay in power.	Note: edited collection. Strong lit review on ME authoritarianism in introduction and first 2 chapters.	Authoritarian regimes not as durable as once thought.	Saudi, Tunisia, Iran, Libya, etc, mixed methods.
Stephen J. King, 2009, <i>New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa</i> . Bloomington: Indiana University Press.	No precise definition given.	Detailed discussion on what democracies should look like.	‘How did authoritarian leaders in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Tunisia initiate these political openings and economic transformations yet maintain authority and control? This book argues that the authoritarian leaders of the Arab socialist republics made timid turns toward democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, but then utilized single-party organizational resources and patronage-based economic liberalization to subvert full democratization and reinforce control over a new authoritarian system that included liberal economic policies, new ruling coalitions, some controlled political pluralism, and electoral legitimation strategies.’ P. 4	Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, mixed methods.

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Holger Albrecht, 2013, <i>Raging Against the Machine: Political Opposition Under Authoritarianism in Egypt</i> . Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.	No precise definition given.	More historical, but a further reading item.	How authoritarian regimes remain in power despite some opposition.	Egypt, 1981-2011 (Mubarak), historical, secondary sources.
Isa Blumi, 2010, <i>Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism</i> . Abingdon: Routledge.	No precise definition given.	Only marginally relevant; mostly historical, but a further reading item.	Overview of complex factors underpinning ‘chaos’ in Yemen, and endurance of authoritarian rule.	Yemen, 1978-2009, historical, secondary sources.
Sarah Phillips, 2008, <i>Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism</i> . New York: Palgrave Macmillan.	<p>‘This study follows Marsha Pripstein Posusney’s suggestion that the adjective “pluralized” is better suited than “liberalized” to the variant of authoritarianism that exists throughout much of the Arab Middle East.’ P. 4</p> <p>‘pluralized authoritarian regimes rely also on their soft power capacity. The regimes present themselves as the guarantors of stability and highlight the lack of realistic alternatives to their rule. They also allow a degree of free expression, parliaments that are sufficiently representative of the population to take its pulse on key issues, some welfare benefits, and opportunities for further benefits for the opposition (and potential opposition) if it submits to the regime’s dominance. Members of the opposition and other politically relevant actors are</p>	Provides a good overview of competing understandings of democracy (Schumpeter vs. Dahl) from p. 20 onwards.	<p>Understanding Yemen’s regime:</p> <p>‘The version of authoritarianism that exists in Yemen gives citizens the ability to speak with relative freedom, without the ability to act correspondingly. Expansions to free expression and political association that coexist with the repression of political action (in all but a marginal sense) have reinforced either debate or, at the other end of the spectrum, spontaneous violence as the most viable form of action.’ P. 6-7</p>	Yemen since Salah’s 1990 announcement of the need to democratise.

	thereby persuaded and usually lured financially into dampening their resistance to the leaders. The political status quo and the endurance of the regime are enabled by a flexible system of patronage and the ability to reinforce this with the threat of physical force' p. 167			
Raymond Hinnebusch, 2012, 'Syria: from 'authoritarian upgrading' to revolution?', <i>International Affairs</i> , 88, no. 1, 95-113.	No precise definition given.	N/A	Considers the longevity of the Baath rule in Syria under Asads.	Syria under the Asads. Mostly narrative format (no clear data samples, methods, etc.)
Marsha Pripstein Posusney, 2004, 'Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory', <i>Comparative Politics</i> , 36, no. 2, pp. 127-138.	No precise definition given.	Introduction to a special issue, but gives an overview of how authoritarianism in the ME has been approached in literature. 'Arguments on democratization can generally be divided into two categories: those that focus on the necessary economic, cultural, or institutional prerequisites for transitions from authoritarianism, and those that see democratization as a contingent choice of regime and opposition actors that can occur in a variety of socioeconomic and cultural conditions.' P. 128	N/A	Middle East theoretical (no clear data sample).
Eva Bellin, 2004, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective', <i>Comparative Politics</i> , 36, no. 2, pp. 139-157.	No precise definition given.	N/A	Explaining enduring authoritarian regimes (strong militaries to put down protests) Conclusion: 'In the absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive apparatus will lead, not to democracy, but rather to authoritarianism of a different stripe or, worse, chaos. To anchor democracy in the region, political reformers must focus on building	Middle East, last few decades, loose method and theoretical (no clear data sample).

			effective, impartial state institutions, nurturing associations that reach across ethnic lines and unite people around common economic and cultural interests, and fostering economic growth that will increase per capita GNP into the zone of democratic possibility.' P. 153	
Eva Bellin, 2012, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring', <i>Comparative Politics</i> , 44, no. , p.. 127-149.	No precise definition given.	N/A	Does toppling of some regimes undermine the idea that strong coercive apparatuses are the reason regimes endure? No: an understanding of why some militaries crack down, while others do not, is needed.	Middle East Arab Spring. Loose method, no clear data samples.
Oded Haklai, 2009, 'Authoritarianism and Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research and Theory-Building', <i>International Studies Review</i> , 11, no. 1, pp. 27-45.	No precise definition given.	N/A	Explains how different theoretical approaches have been, and can be, used for studying regimes in ME. A further reading item possibly.	Overview of different methods for studying regimes in ME.
Raymond Hinnebusch (2006) 'Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An overview and critique', <i>Democratization</i> , 13:3, 373-395.	No precise definition given.	'Authoritarianism is the modal form of governance in the Middle East for several reasons. Extremely hostile structural conditions that include limited modernization, an unsolved national problem, and particular class configurations aborted early limited democracies. Their authoritarian successors found the resources to build robust modernized forms of authoritarianism congruent with this environment. These regimes constructed institutions incorporating sufficient social forces to enable them to manage their societies, thus raising the threshold of modernization beyond which authoritarian governance becomes unviable. While, subsequently, internal economic vulnerabilities and global pressures	Explaining endurance of authoritarianism in ME and how to democratize: 'Two paths to democratization are possible. If reformist authoritarian regimes can deliver increased rule of law, better regulatory frameworks, educational reforms and merit-based recruitment to the bureaucracy, they could precipitate the investment and economic growth needed to expand the middle class, civil society and an independent bourgeoisie, while increasing regime legitimacy and dampening Islamist radicalism. This would create conditions similar to those that precipitated democratic transition in East Asia.' P. 392	Broad, theoretical overview of ME regimes.

		on these regimes became substantial, the post-populist solutions adopted, economic liberalization and westward-looking foreign policy alignment, all allowed an adaptive pluralization of authoritarianism (PPA) while obstructing democratization.' P. 391		
Frédéric Volpi (2013) 'Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring: trajectories of democratization and of authoritarianism in the Maghreb,' <i>Democratization</i> , 20:6, 969-990	No precise definition given.	While not following one type of authoritarian per se, the lit review sections is useful as an overview of different approaches to democratisation in the ME.	Understanding regime durability or collapse in Arab Spring: 'Explanations of institutionalized authoritarianism retain more of their relevance in those situations where the possibility of a gradual reform of the regime is perceived to exist, domestically and internationally. In those contexts, because alternative means of practicing and institutionalizing new forms of political governance are already being considered and routinized to some degree, processes of regime change are articulated in more structured and predictable patterns – that is, reform of institutions. By contrast, the possibility of a sudden and dramatic failure of a regime is best understood in terms of a lack of opportunity for an institutionalized (or partially institutionalized) process of political change. In those situations, explanations of the stability of routine authoritarianism either apply fully, as they did until the popular uprisings, or not at all (once the uprisings gain momentum), because they do not account for the mechanisms of deinstitutionalization and re-institutionalization.' P.983 Conclusion: 'What can be learnt from the recent upheaval in North Africa is that to frame political change as well as stability in the region political analysts and policy-makers need to retain a plurality of explanatory perspectives on what can constitute effective political behaviour in authoritarian systems.' P.984	Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, since 2011. Loose method, no clear data sample.

Global comparisons

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Jennifer Gandhi, Adam Przeworski, 2007, 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocracts', <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> , 40, no. 11, pp. 1279-1301.	No precise definition given.	N/A	<p>Why do some authoritarian regimes last for a long time, but others don't?</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>'Autocrats face two types of threats to their rule: those that emerge from within the ruling elite and those that come from outsiders within society. Authoritarian rulers often establish narrow institutions, such as consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus, as a first institutional trench against threats from rivals within the ruling elite. But we claim that when they need to neutralize threats from larger groups within society and to solicit the cooperation of outsiders, autocrats frequently rely on nominally democratic institutions. Specifically, partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler's survival. By broadening the basis of support for the ruler, these institutions lengthen his tenure.' P. 1280</p>	All authoritarian regimes between 1946-1996. Large-N comparative.
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker, (Editors), 2016, <i>Authoritarianism Goes Global : The Challenge to Democracy</i> . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.	No precise definition given.	Note: edited collection.	Discusses the resurgence of authoritarian regimes, many of which use 'soft-power' to bolster their rule.	Compares Iran, Saudi, China, Russia and Venezuela. Then chapters on soft-power approaches to authoritarian rule. Mixed methods.
Rachel Vanderhill, 2013, <i>Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad</i> . London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.	No precise definition given.	N/A	<p>Studies state-sponsored authoritarianism</p> <p>'[C]omplexity and interaction between external support for authoritarianism, democracy promotion, and local conditions (such as the balance of power between liberal and illiberal elites). Therefore, in this book I seek to do three interrelated things: (1) explain how states support authoritarianism abroad through changing elite strategies and capabilities; (2) illustrate</p>	Russia, Iran and Venezuela, and their promotion of authoritarianism in neighbouring countries. Democracy indices, secondary sources.

			how authoritarian promotion and democracy promotion interact to affect the regime outcome; (3) demonstrate that the effectiveness of external involvement, and the eventual regime outcome, depend not only on the nature and extent of outside support—either liberal or illiberal—but also on the interaction between these external factors and the conditions in the recipient state.’ P. 3	
Erica Frantz, 2018, ‘Voter turnout and opposition performance in competitive authoritarian Elections’, <i>Electoral Studies</i> , 54, pp. 218-225.	No precise definition given.	N/A	<p>Elections in authoritarian regimes:</p> <p>‘There are a variety of reasons why dictatorships allow such contests. Competitive elections in dictatorships serve the purpose of mobilizing support for the regime, legitimizing the system in the eyes of both domestic and international observers, managing intra-elite conflicts, and identifying supporters of the regime for the purposes of patronage distribution.⁸ Importantly, dictatorships use competitive elections as a means of coopting the opposition. By allowing opposition groups some representation, the regime can lure them into contesting the regime according to the rules the regime has established. In doing so, the regime brings opponents out from underground, gaining greater information about their identities, support bases, and activities. Additionally, by letting the opposition participate in elections, the regime gives the opposition reason to fight for change within the system rather than seek to overthrow it. For these reasons, dictatorships that hold competitive elections last longer in power than those that do not.’ P. 219</p>	1991-2010, several countries, but a focus on Malaysia and recent elections. Statistical analysis of voter turnout and election results.
Johannes Gerschewski (2013) ‘The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes,’ <i>Democratization</i> , 20:1, 13-38,	No precise definition given.	Includes a succinct overview of democratisation literature.	<p>Explaining regime survival:</p> <p>‘It will be argued that the stability of all autocracies – irrespective of their subtype – can be explained with reference to what might be aptly called the three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation.⁵ These three pillars are not there from the outset, but need to develop over time. How do they get built, that is how can we make sense theoretically of the</p>	Mainly theoretical (no clear data sample)

			<p>stabilization process? I argue that reinforcement processes take place both within and between the pillars. These processes can take different forms: an exogenous reinforcement process that is propelled by the available power and material resources of the ruling regime; an endogenous self-reinforcement process that triggers path-dependency; and, lastly, a reciprocal reinforcement process that leads to a complementarity advantage between the pillars. I suggest that these three processes should be studied closely for explaining the stabilization of autocratic regimes.' P. 14</p>	
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Africa

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Eds. Hagmann, Tobias, Reyntjens, Filip, 2016, <i>Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa: Development Without Democracy</i>	No precise definition given.	Note: edited collection.	Studying the link between development aid and endurance of authoritarian regimes.	Africa (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Angola) since 1990s. Mixed methods.

Other

Author/Study	Core Attributes	Supplementary Information	Analytical problem	Countries/Regions/Time period
Pål Kolstø Helge Blakkisrud (Editors), 2016, <i>The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015</i> . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.	No precise definition given.	Only marginally relevant	Considers how nationalism is increasing under authoritarian rule in Russia.	Russia, 2000-2015, mixed methods.
Henry A. Giroux, 2018, <i>The Public in Peril: Trump and the Menace of American Authoritarianism</i> . New York: Routledge.	No precise definition given.	An unapologetically polemical and alarmist book, and only marginally relevant, but included because it's so new.	How to confront Trump's model of authoritarianism. 'With Donald Trump now heading the most powerful nation on earth, the scourge of authoritarianism has returned not only in the toxic language of hate, racism, and bigotry, but also in the emergence of a culture of war and violence that looms over society like a plague. War has been redefined in the age of global capitalism. This is especially true for the United States. No longer defined exclusively as a military issue, it has expanded its boundaries and now shapes all aspects of society.' P. 259	USA since Trump.

<p>William Zimmerman, 2014, <i>Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to Putin</i>. Princeton: Princeton University Press.</p>	<p>Compares democratic, competitive authoritarian, full authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes based on a number of criteria: institutions, political opposition, electoral procedures, and regime goals (see p. 5)</p>		<p>Looks at the endurance of authoritarianism in Russia.</p> <p>Looking forwards:</p> <p>‘[T]he prospects for full authoritarianism may be better than those for competitive authoritarianism. There is too little by way of independent institutions—thoroughly independent courts, genuinely competitive parties other than United Russia or its possible successor, independent media—to envisage a democratic outcome by the end of Putin’s current term.’ P. 302</p>	<p>Russia, 1917-2013. Historical, narrative, mixed methods.</p>
<p>Anthony W. Pereira, 2005, <i>Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina</i>, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>Further reading item.</p>	<p>Compares Brazil, Chile, and Argentina’s different authoritarian regimes, including their different uses of the law in maintaining control.</p>	<p>Brazil, Chile, Argentina 1960s-1980s. Mixed methods, interviews, polls, secondary sources.</p>
<p>Vicki Hesli Claypool, William M. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Yue Hu, Jenny Juehring, 2018, ‘Tsar Putin and the “corruption” thorn in his side: The demobilization of votes in a competitive authoritarian regime’, <i>Electoral Studies</i>, 54, pp. 182-204.</p>	<p>No precise definition given, but uses ‘competitive authoritarianism’ typology.</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Understanding elections in competitive authoritarian regimes.</p> <p>Corruption can damage regimes’ stability if it means citizens are unmotivated to vote in (unfair) elections due to perceived corruption.</p>	<p>Large-N, Russian citizen surveys.</p>
<p>Kurt Weyland, 2013, ‘Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left’, <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 24, no. 3, pp. 18-32.</p>	<p>No precise definition given.</p>	<p>Further reading item.</p>	<p>Despite a recent history of democratic consolidation, a new authoritarianism is becoming clear in Latin America: leftist populism (Chavez).</p>	<p>Latin American (mostly Venezuela, Argentina). Narrative-based, no clear method or data collection.</p>