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States of Knowledge
The co-production of science and social order

Edited by Sheila Jasanoff
xii Acknowledgements

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Sheila Jasanoff
Cambridge MA, May 2003

1 The idiom of co-production

Sheila Jasanoff

Science and technology permeate the culture and politics of modernity. On any day, the headline news provides crude but telling indicators of their influence. A Martian ethnographer visiting planet Earth in the first few years of the third millennium would have encountered a bewildering array of stories whose only discernible connection would have been the pervasive—and perversely inconsistent—role of science and technology in human affairs. The millennium opened with false fears of the so-called Y2K bug that might have made computer systems throughout the world crash at midnight, when 1999 rotated into 2000. In 2001, the seemingly well regulated technological system of American civil aviation was ferociously turned upon itself by young Islamic militants, who not only destroyed New York’s tallest buildings, the twin towers of the World Trade Center, but used planes to expose unsuspected vulnerabilities at the heart of US domestic security. In retaliation, the United States launched two militarily successful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating that the advent of “smart weapons” had radically altered the dynamics of battle since the Vietnam era; by the official end of the Iraq invasion, some US observers even wondered (in a luxury permitted only to winners) whether modern warfare any longer needed human bodies on the front lines. Early 2003 also saw the loss of the US space shuttle Columbia with seven crew members, underlining again the fragility of manned space exploration. Behind the dramatic disasters and the violence of terrorism and war, ordinary human attempts to master nature proceeded at slower rhythms, as societies debated how to manage global climate change, AIDS, and other epidemic diseases; how to solve problems of clean water and renewable energy; how to improve crop yields without endangering farmers’ livelihoods; how to treat the ancient infirmities of aging, infertility, mental illness, and disease; and how to stave off death itself.

Yet, in analyzing many of the defining phenomena of human history—those arising at the nexus of science, technology, culture and power—large segments of the social sciences seem almost to retreat into a conspiracy of silence. In a world increasingly driven by the market’s logic, and by the discovery of knowledge as a resource, neoclassical economics and rational choice models have sought to explain why firms innovate and how governments can steer research and development for higher productivity (Branscomb and Keller 1998; also see Rosenberg...
knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions — in short, in all the building blocks of what we term the social. The same can be said even more forcefully of technology.

Co-productionist accounts, conceived in this way, avoid the charges of both natural and social determinism that have featured in recent academic debates around the field of science and technology studies, including the infamous "science wars" of the 1990s (Sokal and Bricmont 1998; Koons and Levitt 1994). Science, in the co-productionist framework, is understood as neither a simple reflection of the truth about nature nor an epiphenomenon of social and political interests. Rather, co-production is symmetrical in that it calls attention to the social dimensions of cognitive commitments and understandings, while at the same time underscoring the epistemic and material correlates of social formations. Co-production can therefore be seen as a critique of the realist ideology that persistently separates the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics. However, co-production, in the view of contributors to this volume, should not be advanced as a fully fledged theory, claiming lawlike consistency and predictive power, but is far more an idiom, a way of interpreting and accounting for complex phenomena so as to avoid the strategic deletions and omissions of most other approaches in the social sciences.

The essays in this collection, then, endeavor to address audiences within S&TS and in neighboring social sciences, as well as interested readers in the humanities, sciences and policy institutions. As is implied by the book's title, Science of Knowledge, a significant aim of several of the contributors is to explore how knowledge-making is incorporated into practices of state-making or of governance more broadly, and, in reverse, how practices of governance influence the making and use of knowledge. States, we may say, are made of knowledge, just as knowledge is constituted by states. But the title also plays on the theme of co-production at additional levels. Knowledge, in particular, is seen as crystallizing in certain ontological states — organizational, material, embodied — that become objects of study in their own right.

The authors seek to illuminate some shared concerns as well as some possible tensions between S&TS and more established fields. In pursuing these objectives, the book attempts to synthesize findings from the various subfields of science and technology studies (e.g. history of science, technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, feminist and cultural studies of science and technology, science and law, and science policy studies). Not all of the synthesis, however, is internalist, working exclusively within the core of S&TS. Once we approach the interconnectivity of nature and society with a co-productionist vision, we find echoes of and parallels to the concerns of science studies in other interpretive social sciences, from anthropology to political theory. Exploring some of these convergences is as much a project of this book as theorizing across S&TS. Indeed, the book makes explicit efforts to link literatures that have not previously
been in conversation, revealing connections that should not only interest S&T researchers but reverberate throughout the social sciences.

That said, a major purpose of the synthesis offered here is to highlight some cross-cutting theoretical assumptions in S&T scholarship, as well as their normative implications. Showing why S&T methods and findings are of potential interest for the analysis of power, culture, and social change. Coming from disciplinary backgrounds in history, politics, sociology, law, anthropology, physics, and science studies, the contributing authors vary in their research focus and methodological preferences, yet they epitomize the common orientations of many S&T scholars toward the relationship between knowledge and social order. In jointly presenting their views on co-production, the authors emphasize the analytic achievements of S&T as a whole in relation to other areas of current humanistic and social thought. They also help contradict certain frequent but unfounded criticisms of S&T scholarship: that it is too micro-focused to speak convincingly to social theory; too internalist in its focus on science and technology to hold interest for students of other social phenomena; and too lacking in normative bite to be sufficiently critical (Woodhouse et al. 2002; Scott et al. 1990).

The idiom of co-production speaks to the agendas of the traditional social sciences (and to some extent the humanities) in a number of ways. It fits most comfortably with the interpretive turn in the social sciences, emphasizing dimensions of meaning, discourse and textuality. This approach addresses and complements a number of specific disciplinary lines of thought. To political scientists, particularly those working in post-structuralist frameworks, co-production offers new ways of thinking about power, highlighting the often invisible role of knowledges, expertise, technical practices and material objects in shaping, sustaining, subverting, or transforming relationships of authority. To anthropologists and social theorists, the co-production framework presents more varied and dynamic ways of conceptualizing social structures and categories, stressing the interconnections between the macro and the micro, between emergence and stabilization, and between knowledge and practice. To anthropologists, it offers further tools for analyzing problems of essentialism and stereotypic reproduction, showing how the cultural capacity to produce and validate knowledges and artifacts can account for long-term stability, as well as creativity and change. Finally, co-productionist accounts take on the normative concerns of political theory and moral philosophy by revealing unsuspected dimensions of ethics, values, lawfulness and power within the epistemic, material and social formations that constitute science and technology.

In all these respects, the co-productionist approach in S&T is entirely compatible with projects in the history of science and technology. It is hardly surprising, then, that several contributors to this volume are historians by training (Daston, Dear, Denhini, Storey). An important value of the co-production idiom is that it may encourage more fruitful dialogue between historical and contemporary studies of science and technology, denying temporality the right to operate as a predefined conceptual and methodological barrier within S&T. As co-productionist studies make clear, investigations of current science and technology stand to benefit immeasurably from greater historical depth, just as historical work may gain profundity and relevance through more explicit attention to questions of power, culture, and normativity. Research on the idea of co-production has centered around a number of shared theoretical questions and their methodological consequences. At what levels of social aggregation (laboratories, communities, cultures, the nation, the state, all of humanity), and in what kinds of institutional spaces or structures does it make sense to look for co-production? Put differently, what is it that gets co-produced in nature and society? Are the most useful insights about co-production to be discovered at the level of science, power and culture writ large? Or is it more illuminating to trace in fine-grained detail how particular concepts for classifying or ordering social worlds – for example, selfhood, national identity, illness or wellness, professional standing, expertise, citizenship – gain, or have gained, stability and coherence, along with equally particular expressions of knowledge – for example, genetic markers, measures of human intelligence, climate change, agricultural science, or the scarcity of elephants? The essays in this volume demonstrate that there is no necessary unanimity about these matters in current research in the co-productionist framework; rather, the very open-endedness of the authors’ methodological choices, along with the diversity of their substantive topics, gives this turn in S&T scholarship some of its undeniable exuberance. At whichever scale individual studies are framed, though, the findings help to clarify how power originates, where it gets lodged, who wields it, by what means, and with what effect within the complex networks of contemporary societies.

Several recurrent and partially overlapping preoccupations in S&T scholarship are common among the contributors, both in terms of organizing (and, in the future, fostering) work in the co-productionist idiom. The first is to do with the emergence and stabilization of new objects or phenomena: how people recognize them, name them, investigate them, and assign meaning to them; and how they mark them off from other existing entities, creating new languages in which to speak of them and new ways of visually representing them (Daston 2000; Dear 1995; Pickering 1995; Latour 1999; 1987). The second concerns the framing and resolution of controversies. Under this heading, a large body of S&T research has looked at the practices and processes by which one set of ideas gains supremacy over competing, possibly better established ones, or fails to do so (Richards and Martin 1995; Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Collins 1985). The third important line of research centers on the intelligibility and portability of the products of science and technology across time, place and institutional contexts. Topics under this heading range from the standardization of measures and analytic tools to the formation of new communities of practice, such as expert committees, who are capable of endowing claims with credibility as they are transported across different cultures of production and interpretation (Bawker and Star 1999; Jasanoff 1995; Shapin 1994; Porter 1992; Latour 1987; Kuhn 1962). The fourth significant tradition examines the cultural practices of science and technology in contexts that endow
them with legitimacy and meaning. Work in this vein has asked how the
supposed universality of facts and artifacts fares in disparate political and
cultural settings, as well as how different domains of research and development
aquire and retain particular cultural characteristics (Knorr-Cetina 1999;
Rabinow 1996; Traweek 1988).

In each of these four focal areas — the emergence of new phenomena, the
resolution of conflicts, the standardization of knowledge or technology, and the
culturation of scientific practices — work in the co-productionist idiom stresses
the constant intertwining of the cognitive, the material, the social and the
normative. Co-production is not about ideas alone; it is equally about concrete,
physical things. It is not only about how people organize or express themselves,
but also about what they value and how they assume responsibility for their
inventions. Equally to the point, co-production occurs neither at random nor
contingently, but along certain well documented pathways. Four sites of co-
production are repeatedly investigated by the contributors to this volume:
making identities, making institutions, making discourses and making represen-
tations. These provide an important bridge between the S&TS literature and many of
the core productions of traditional political and social analysis, which also
revolve around these basic analytic categories.

**Essays in co-production**

As an interpretive framework, co-production begs for illustration rather than
proof. The chapters that follow display the idiom's breadth and plasticity, but in
working out co-productionist ideas through detailed empirical studies, they also
sharpen the framework's practical uses and limits. In the next chapter, I make
the theoretical case for co-production as an analytically useful concept by delin-
eating the spaces it seeks to fill between dominant frames of analysis espoused by
the social sciences. The chapter provides a detailed review of the S&TS literature
that underwrites work in the co-productionist idiom. Here, we encounter two
streams of thought: one focused broadly on the constitution of new technoscien-
tific cultures, often around emergent ideas and objects; the other on solving
problems of disorder within established cultures. I refer to these as the constitutive
and interactional strands, respectively; they correspond broadly to well docu-
mented S&TS engagements with metaphysics and epistemology — or, as Hacking
phrases it, "what there is and how we find out about it" (1999: 169). The chapter
next outlines the programmatic aims of research on the theme of co-production
and elaborates on the pathways by which co-production most often occurs. I
conclude with reflections on how co-productionist ideas may help connect S&TS
work to ongoing intellectual projects in other fields of social analysis.

The remaining chapters are grouped under three sets of thematic as well as
topical headings. The first group — by Miller, Thompson, Waterton and Wynne,
and Storey — looks at evolving perceptions of the environment and nature as sites
do co-production; all these authors centrally engage with the simultaneous emer-
gence of new knowledge, institutions and identities related to environmental
change. The second group, consisting of chapters by Hilgarmer, Rabebarisoro
and Callon, Lynch, and in part Carson, investigates co-production as related to
developments in the human and life sciences, especially the practices of research
communities in genetics, clinical medicine and forensic science. These chapters
bring to the fore issues of intelligibility and portability of knowledge, linked to
the formation of new social identities and expert discourses. The third group, by
Carson, Dear, Denniss, and Ezrahi, addresses a complex of issues centering on
the macro-politics of knowledge; they focus on institutional conflicts among
cognitive, moral and political authority, the mediating presence of experts, and
the role of science and technology at times of significant political change. The
connections between scientific knowledge-making and other authoritative
cultural practices (religion, military, media) figure importantly in these chapters,
which also deal with conflicts between alternative institutionalized knowledge-
power formations. In short, these chapters play upon the book's title — states of
knowledge — in its most open and obvious meaning.

With these groupings in mind, let us turn to a more detailed review of the
individual contributions. The theme of institutional and epistemic emergence, as
already mentioned, is especially prominent in the chapters dealing with the
construction and deployment of environmental knowledge and the building of
transnational political orders. Clark Miller addresses these issues on a planetary,
or global, scale. Creating environmental knowledge about the biosphere involves,
he suggests, not only new sciences and technologies, such as satellite data,
general circulation models and integrated assessments, but also the fabrication of
new institutions whose authority can credibly span the globe. Globalization, on
Miller's account, is not simply the result of pre-stabilized knowledges, beliefs,
products and social identities traveling around the world. Rather, we see the
manufacture of a newly imagined global political order that both links and tran-
sends earlier nation-based centers of knowledge and power. Miller shows how
the framing of climate change as a global issue, replacing the earlier view of
climate as an aggregation of local weather problems, supplied a rationale for
creating global institutions with claims to both scientific and political legitimacy.
Previews several succeeding chapters, Miller also shows that the attempt to
supercede existing political orders produces its own tensions, exposing disagree-
ments about the nature of "good science" as well as "good politics" on a
supranational scale.

In her account of elephant protection in Africa, Charis Thompson examines co-
production from the standpoint of international environmental regimes. She
questions the presumption that knowledge must be consolidated in particular
places before it can travel freely to other locations. Thompson argues that the
shift in the elephant's status from "endangered" to "manageable" was not due to
a context-specific, scientific determination of elephant biology, but went hand-
in-hand with the emergence of a pan-African identity that could support
multi-sited management practices. Originally forced to accept an absolutist
scientific discourse of endangerment, African nations were enabled, through
successive rounds of international negotiation, to put forward their view that
elephants could be both hunted and protected in a regime of sustainable development. This "African" position, which merged ethics with science and made space for regional variation, successfully countered the monolithic bureaucratic rationality of some Western environmentalists. It produced, in effect, an authentically "African" elephant, unshackled by global discourse. A North-South dialogue that reopened divisions between lay and expert, and science and politics, led to the creation of a new moral economy around the elephant—thus making it possible to defend a new ontology for this most charismatic of all large animal species.

Claire Waterton and Brian Wynne also situate their study in the international arena as they examine how institutions and identities are bound up in processes of new knowledge formation. Their focus is on the European Environment Agency (EEA), a body that has been called upon to imagine and project a vision of Europe while at the same time shaping its own identity as a provider of objective, useful environmental knowledge to European policymakers. The agency sits at what one of its own analysts eloquently describes as "the eye of the hurricane" of European integration. The dilemma that Waterton and Wynne explore is that the EEA is in a sense presupposes a full-blown European identity in order to legitimate its knowledge-producing activities; yet, in the very act of knowledge-making, the EEA participates in enacting Europe's nascent political order, choosing between models not yet set in stone. The evaluation of genetically modified (GM) crops and environmental chemicals illustrates the practical working out of this tension. The EEA, as Waterton and Wynne argue, recognizes that environmental uncertainty and risk demand new forms of deliberation and a critical approach to the existing centralized and officially sanctioned policy processes. At the same time, for its own legitimacy, as well as for the sake of the imagined, Platonic Europe that is aspiring, the EEA cannot wholly let go of older assumptions of universal science and expert rationality. The EEA's experiences in this respect is all about the messy and contested emergence of alternatives to the rationalizing, high-modernist state.

William Storey provides a historical counterpoint to the contemporary cases in his account of the foundation of the Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West Indies in 1898. The Department represented an institutional solution to a complex and overlapping set of problems: ecological and economic crisis in Britain's sugar-producing colonies; the unreliability of colonial science; Britain's changing imperial objectives and policies; and the urge to remedy, with the aid of science, perceived social problems that were deemed to be natural. As Storey observes, this was no simple case of science influencing politics or politics influencing science; rather, each set of practices—scientific and political—provided a rationale for the other. This interplay produced a powerful institutional form that was copied in agriculture departments throughout the world and provided a template for an emerging imperial politics.

The human and life sciences are particularly rewarding sites for co-productionist accounts because they are so often implicated in all of the important manifestations of this process discussed above: emergence, contestation, standardization and enculturation. The second group of chapters engages with these dynamics, and the associated roles of several non-state actors, such as scientists, patient groups and litigating parties. Stephen Hilgartner usefully reminds us that the institutions involved in co-production need not be those of the state. Practices for creating and contesting ownership, Hilgartner demonstrates, are deeply embedded in laboratories, where they shape both the internal workings of science and science's relations with the outside world. In his study, the laboratory becomes a site in which the institutions of property and ownership are redefined. Appropriation practices in genome laboratories thus constitute an inseparable part of their technological structure, moral order and everyday operation. Hilgartner's genome scientists challenge essentialist understandings of some basic social science categories. Their discourse blurs the contrast between micro and macro, and they remake the notions of "public" and "private" science through situated debates about who owns what in the laboratory.

Rabharisosa and Callon also discuss a new kind of non-state institution, the "reflective organization", which cuts across accepted divisions between lay and expert actors, and facilitates inquiry in a domain that increasingly demands the participation of the patient as an active research collaborator as well as a traditional research subject. Their investigation of the Association of French Muscular Dystrophy Patients shows lay individuals negotiating details of research and practice that are ordinarily thought to be the monopoly of specialist clinicians and scientists. The incorporation of a genetic disease as an element of their identity empowers muscular dystrophy patients and their families to participate in both knowledge-making and political action. Appearing, as it were, on both sides of scientific practice—as researchers and researched—the patient negate the conventional distinction between subject and object that has animated the work of science; only by acting as subjects can patients provide their partners, the orthodox scientific investigators, with a viable object of study. Further, by shaping novel discursive and organizational practices, they reorder many widely held assumptions about how biomedical science should be done in the contemporary world.

Michael Lynch directs his analysis toward the co-production of expert and non-expert knowledges in the context of US common law trials in the late twentieth century. This process, Lynch argues, does not consist simply of drawing a boundary between the two domains. Rather, it requires definition of the very category of expert and the assignment of particular individuals to that category. His analysis of cross-examination shows that the expert's identity is founded on an individual's control of recognized knowledge and skills, but through mundane conversations and humdrum instruments, such as courtroom presentation of the professional résumé. Like Hilgartner, Lynch problematizes the easy distinction between micro- and macro-analytic categories. Courts engaging with forensic scientific evidence, he argues, are oblivious to such theoretical distinctions. In examining the credentials of a forensic DNA expert, for example, the court problematizes the "macro" categories of "science" and "expert" by enabling micro-, context-specific, adversarial dialogues to occur between
witnesses and cross-examining attorneys. Lynch's "grammatical perspective" shows how the use of ordinary words allows courts to shift between two registers: on the one hand, paying homage to science's transcendence by seeming to honor the categories that set science apart; on the other, remaking the distinctions between science and common sense through case-centered decision-making. Courts in this way perform some of the essential political work of liberal democracies, by invoking and continually reproducing through their own practices the boundary between science and non-science.

John Carson turns his eye on a core problem of contemporary democracy, the fair distribution of scarce resources such as access to educational opportunities. Comparing the genesis of intelligence testing in early-twentieth-century France and the United States, he displays how one of the most taken-for-granted aspects of human identity—intelligence—has been configured in different ways in two different democratic cultures. Both intelligence and tests of it are emergent scientific objects, constituted through evolving expert discourses; but, going beyond normal accounts of science in the making, Carson's chapter compellingly delineates the political work done by these characterizations of human competence. Variations in the definition and measurement of intelligence between France and the United States can be attributed, he argues, to divergent understandings of equality in the two countries. In France, the democratic challenge is to represent existing social hierarchies as potentially open to all citizens. This has correlated with the assessment of merit through a standardized, state-administered educational system, in which performance according to collectively defined standards—not birth or heredity—is the putative guarantor of success. In the United States, by contrast, hierarchies of merit are publicly disavowed, education is highly decentralized, and the federal role in rearing educated citizens is both constitutionally and ideologically circumscribed. The process of privatized, quantified and privately administered intelligence testing has taken root in this context as an objective, "scientific" instrument for sorting and classifying citizens—yet one which, given its power to produce inequality, remains essentially contested.

How the authority of science conflicts with or warrants other forms of authority, particularly the authority to govern at times of pronounced social change, is the central theme of the three remaining chapters in this volume. The co-production of knowledge comes into focus as different forms of authority are constituted, embodied, challenged and restabilized. Peter Dear reflects on the interdependence of civil and epistemological authority in seventeenth-century Europe, as natural philosophers wrestled with the sources of legitimate expertise. The political theory underpinning absolutist ideologies of "mystery of state" applied, he suggests, to the establishment of knowledge—claims made through new kinds of experimental procedures resting on observations of nature. The credibility of such demonstrations could not be fully broken down into reasons, or analyzable components, that did not depend, at some irreducible core, on the reliability of the experimenter. For experimental results to be authoritative, experts thus needed recourse to some shared domain of unquestioned moral authority where further explanation was no longer felt to be necessary. In early modernity, Dear proposes, the rituals of absolute monarchy, including display to aristocratic audiences, provided natural philosophers with one such resource for establishing their own claims of transcendental expertise.

Michael Denis's chapter focuses on the postwar confrontation in the United States between a science profoundly dependent on military funding and the state's defensive interests and the vision of science entertained by Michael Polanyi (1962) and others as an autonomous republic of free-thinking citizens. Vannevar Bush, a contemporary of Robert Oppenheimer and key presidential science adviser, embodies the precipitous effort to resolve these contradictions. Denis's portrayal of Bush uses a suggestive image—Bush's head surrounded by a crown of destructive weaponry—to symbolize the unresolved tensions between the bin of overdependence on a military agenda and redemption, through basic research, in postwar American science. Although Bush is widely identified as the chief architect of the National Science Foundation and author of American society's "contract with science", he is here revealed as a tragic figure, unable to rein in the momentum of militarization and state patronage unleashed by the war. In a personal defeat, this relic of an earlier, more gentlemanly era of independent expertise is sidelined in the less civil, more resource-hungry order of knowledge and power that he did so much to bring into being.

Yaron Ezrahi's essay deals with the most fundamental kind of political crisis—a change in the very foundations of contemporary democracy. Departing from his earlier magisterial work on modern science as legitimate model and model for liberal democratic politics (Ezrahi 1990), Ezrahi notes that in today's world the representations of reality produced by science, and shared by a democratic citizenry, fight for space in the public mind with the onslaught of images created and disseminated worldwide by the mass media. In contrast to the esoteric knowledge and information produced at great expense by science, media representations, which Ezrahi suggestively calls "aurifications", are generally much more accessible to publics. They require less time, effort, knowledge and skills to interpret than does the information generated by science. However expensive they are to produce, media representations, once created, can be accessed by widely dispersed consumers and publics at relatively little additional cost. Media representations also contravene some of the most basic assumptions of scientific reality: that emotion, ambiguity, subjectivity and the inner self have to be bounded out of the space in which we perceive what is truly real. In these respects, they are more appealing to ordinary citizens. Increasingly, Ezrahi argues, the relatively high-cost, high-entry-barrier reality of science has had to distance itself from everyday human experience; lower-cost, more accessible media realities to some extent fill the imaginative void left by the retreat of science. Like other authors in this collection, Ezrahi is careful to note that he is not describing the overthrow of a hegemonic Enlightenment tradition by one that is equally totalizing in its fragmentation of human perceptions. What he describes is far more an emerging of competing claims on the democratic
political imagination, whose implications for liberty and order we are not yet in
a position to assess.

Finally, in a brief Afterword, I pull together and reiterate the thematic connec-
tions among the chapters, noting that they collectively make a strong case against
linear, unidirectional causal explanations for complex social phenomena; they also
reinforce the need to integrate studies of knowledge-making and technology-
production with the analysis of human identities, institutions, discourses and
representations. I conclude with some observations on the possible implications of
co-production as a cognitive frame that itself gets picked up into newer cycles of
world-making.

Note

1 I am especially grateful to Pablo Boczkowski for helping me to articulate the multiple
meanings of the title of this volume.

2 Ordering knowledge,
ordering society

Sheila Jasanoff

Science in culture and politics

Science and technology account for many of the signature characteristics of
contemporary societies: the uncertainty, unaccountability and speed that
contribute, at the level of personal experience, to feelings of being perpetually
off balance; the reduction of individuals to standard classifications that demar-
cate the normal from the deviant and authorize varieties of social control; the
skepticism, alienation and distrust that threaten the legitimacy of public action;
and the oscillation between visions of doom and visions of progress that destabi-
lize the future. Both doing and being, whether in the high citadels of modernity
or its distant outposts, play out in territories shaped by scientific and technolog-
ical invention. Our methods of understanding and manipulating the world curve
back and reorder our collective experience along unforeseen pathways, like the
seemingly domesticated chlorofluorocarbons released from spray cans and air
conditioners that silently ate away at the earth’s stratospheric ozone layer. Not as
environmental scientists are hard put to find on earth an ecological system that
has not been affected by human activity, so it is difficult for social scientists to
locate forms of human organization or behavior anywhere in the world whose
structure and function have not been affected, to some extent, by science and
technology.

Take culture, in particular, or more accurately cultures. Although science and
technology are present everywhere, the rambunctious storyline of modernity refuses
to conform to any singular narrative of enlightenment or progress. The familiar
ingredients of modern life continually rearrange themselves in unpredicted
patterns, creating rupture, violence and difference alongside the sense of increasing
liberation, convergence and control. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11
September 2001 acted out in brutal reality and on global television screens many
contradictions that were already seething below the surface. On a clear, sparkling
day in early fall, nineteen young Muslim militants hijacked four civilian aircraft and
rammed them into the World Trade Center’s twin towers in New York, the
Pentagon in Washington, and a field outside Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This was
suicidal violence on a previously imagined scale. The pyres on which the
hijackers immolated themselves killed more than 3,000 innocent people who had