

Thursday, 27<sup>th</sup> August

# Assessing the 1920s Compromise

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


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#### 4 Steps (or 3 tiers)

- Identify the MNE's profits
- Separate out profits attributable to routine functions
- Attribute a portion of the non-routine (residual) profits to the market jurisdiction
- Allocate the deemed residual income to eligible market jurisdictions

#### Finding 'Amount A' under the three-tier approach




Allocate taxing right to  
market jurisdictions  
(‘Amount A’)

# Assessing the 2020s compromise



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Seven Challenges to 1920s Cimpromise	Pillar One (Amount A) Non-arm's length principle?	Pillar One (Amount B) Arm's-length principle	Pillar Two (income inclusion rule)	Pillar Two (base erosion payments)
<b>(1) The vanishing ability to tax business profits</b>				
<b>(1A) Nexus</b>	Digital business no requirement for PE			
<b>(1B) Allocating income</b>	1920s compromised allocated profits to factors of production (residence-based) but the 2020s compromise allocates profits to the marketplace	Under the modified residual profit split method a fixed remuneration for baseline marketing and distribution functions is attributed to the marketplace		
<b>(2) The use of data, the contribution of users and the measurement of their value</b>	A component of income allocated to the market jurisdiction for the use, creation and valuation of data			
<b>(3) The reliance on, and mobility of, intellectual property</b>			If intellectual property is located in a low tax jurisdiction	Royalties paid for the use of intellectual property might be subject to the undertaxed payments rule or the switchover rule

# Assessing the 2020s compromise



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<p><b>(4) The characterisation of transactions and income</b></p>	<p>Income characterised as business profits could be included in Amount A overcoming the nexus requirements</p>		<p>Income diverted to a low tax jurisdiction can be subject to the IRR</p>	<p>Transactions characterised as deductible payments would be caught by the UPR or SR</p>
<p><b>(5) The failure of transfer pricing with certain MNEs and their transactions</b></p>	<p>The profit allocation rules ignore the single entity concept of allocating profit on a modified residual profit split basis</p>	<p>Amount B provides a fixed remuneration for baseline marketing and distribution functions in the market jurisdiction</p>	<p>The IIR overcomes the risk of transfer pricing profits to low tax jurisdictions</p>	<p>By denying deductions or imposing a withholding tax the use of arm's-length transfer pricing techniques to shift profits is reduced</p>
<p><b>(6) The inadequacy of residence-based taxation</b></p>			<p>The IIR are reduces the incentive to incorporate an entity in a low tax jurisdiction</p>	<p>Denying deductions or imposing withholding taxes on profits shifted to entities in low tax jurisdictions</p>
<p><b>(7) Competition by States</b></p>	<p>Through one lens tax competition through highly digitalised entities has enabled a huge competitive advantage that Amount A addresses in a small way</p>		<p>The IIR is designed to eliminate the advantages of incorporation in a low tax jurisdiction</p>	<p>The undertaxed payments rules also address profit shifting</p>





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