Latest Volume
2022 Volume 25 Issue 1
Articles
Art law and policy in Australia and the appropriation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art styles
Marie Hadley and Clara Klemski
Abstract
In 2018, British artist Damien Hirst was accused of cultural appropriation of Aboriginal art from Alice Springs, Australia, for his series of 24 abstract expressionist paintings known as ‘The Veil Paintings’. This article uses the contestation surrounding The Veil Paintings to animate a discussion of the legal status of ‘style appropriation’ — that is, the appropriation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art styles, designs and motifs — under customary law, copyright law, cultural heritage laws and consumer law, as well as recent art policy and law reform initiatives. While there is momentum in favour of greater regulation of intercultural engagements with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art, particularly following recognition of the cultural and economic harms of fake art and the push for intangible heritage protection, legal protections against style appropriation remain limited in scope under the Australian legal system.
In 2018, British artist Damien Hirst was accused of cultural appropriation of Aboriginal art from Alice Springs, Australia, for his series of 24 abstract expressionist paintings known as ‘The Veil Paintings’. This article uses the contestation surrounding The Veil Paintings to animate a discussion of the legal status of ‘style appropriation’ — that is, the appropriation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art styles, designs and motifs — under customary law, copyright law, cultural heritage laws and consumer law, as well as recent art policy and law reform initiatives. While there is momentum in favour of greater regulation of intercultural engagements with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art, particularly following recognition of the cultural and economic harms of fake art and the push for intangible heritage protection, legal protections against style appropriation remain limited in scope under the Australian legal system.
Defamation in context: Expanding the defence of contextual truth
Shane Montgomery
Abstract
Amendments to the statutory contextual truth defence of the Uniform Defamation Acts may have (perhaps inadvertently) resulted in the re-enlivening of the ‘Polly Peck’ and ‘Lucas-Box’ defences in Australia. This change should be welcomed. Expanding the ambit of ‘contextual truth’ could see the defence serve its intended purpose, and better enable tribunals of fact to conclusively determine whether a plaintiff’s reputation was actually harmed by a publication, as opposed to focusing on resolving unduly complex and artificial pleading disputes. This article considers the background to the reforms of the s 26 defence, the historical disapproval of Polly Peck and Lucas-Box in Australia, and assesses the future of the defence following its amendments in 2021.
Amendments to the statutory contextual truth defence of the Uniform Defamation Acts may have (perhaps inadvertently) resulted in the re-enlivening of the ‘Polly Peck’ and ‘Lucas-Box’ defences in Australia. This change should be welcomed. Expanding the ambit of ‘contextual truth’ could see the defence serve its intended purpose, and better enable tribunals of fact to conclusively determine whether a plaintiff’s reputation was actually harmed by a publication, as opposed to focusing on resolving unduly complex and artificial pleading disputes. This article considers the background to the reforms of the s 26 defence, the historical disapproval of Polly Peck and Lucas-Box in Australia, and assesses the future of the defence following its amendments in 2021.
New Zealand Media Law Update
New Zealand Media Law Update
Ursula Cheer