Ghoumid and Others v France

Parties (including notable third parties)

Mr Bachir Ghoumid (First Applicant), Mr Fouad Charouali (Second Applicant), Mr Attila Turk (Third Applicant), Mr Redouane Aberbri (Fourth Applicant), Mr Rachid Ait El Haj (Fifth Applicant); French Government (Respondent)

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Summary of Facts

The Applicants are four dual Moroccan-French nationals and one Turkish-French national. Two of the Applicants were born in France and the other three born in Morocco. All five of the Applicants acquired French nationality through various means.

In 2007, the Applicants were convicted by the Paris Correctional Court for participating in a criminal conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. All the Applicants received various prison sentences for this and were released in 2009 or 2010. In 2015, they were deprived of French nationality through an initiative by the Minister of the Interior, with assent from the Council of State (Conseil d’État), and order of the Prime Minister.

The Applicants’ request to suspend the denationalisation decrees was rejected by the Council of State. In the context of the judicial review procedure, the public rapporteur took into consideration the right to respect for private life and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) but considered that the nationality deprivation measures seemed proportionate in view of the seriousness of the acts committed. The Council of State dismissed the Applicants’ judicial review actions in June 2016, finding that the deprivation orders did not disproportionately infringe their right to respect for private life under Article 8.

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Legal Arguments

Legal arguments by the Applicant

The Applicants argued that the loss of their French nationality amounted to an infringement of their right to respect for private life and family life in Article 8 of the ECHR. The complaint regarding family life was later declared inadmissible by the Court.

The Applicants submitted that the decision to deprive them of their nationality was ‘eminently political’ (paragraph 30). They made note that it had been announced in the National Assembly by the Minister of the Interior, and the following day an article was published about the decision.

The Applicants submitted that the decision had not been subject to a full proportionality review and that there had been a disproportionate interference with their right to private life, and that the Council of State’s review had been ‘quite superficial’ (paragraph 31). The measure was taken more than a decade following the event which demonstrated a lack of diligence. They argued since serving their sentence, they had rebuilt their lives, and they were now working and had a family life. They argued that the French Government had not taken account of the specific circumstances of their case or explained why other individuals convicted in the same case had not been deprived of their nationality. They emphasised the political nature of the decision and that they could be subject to ill treatment if deported to Morocco given the details of their convictions. They also submitted that they had no ties to Morocco.

The Applicants further argued that the deprivation of nationality entailed the loss of the right to reside in France, the right to work, and access to social benefits, and that two of them had been the subject of deportation proceedings, demonstrating that their presence in France was no longer secured. They also contended that the measure was merely symbolic and should be weighed against the consequences: loss of voting rights, inability to access public and private employment, loss of European citizenship, and risk of social exclusion.

Legal arguments by the Respondent

The Respondent did not dispute that deprivation of nationality could infringe Article 8 in so far that the right included the right to one’s identity. However, it considered that the deprivation had been prescribed by law, specifically Article 25-1 of the Civil Code, and pointed out that the time-limit for imposing this measure had been increased from ten years to fifteen years in 2006. The Respondent submitted that this law was therefore applied correctly, as held by the Council of State. The Respondent held that the Applicants were given all of the necessary procedural safeguards to defend their interests, which they exercised, and the deprivation decision was only made from a final conviction where all materials facts had been laid out and discussed in separate proceedings.

The Respondent additionally submitted that the time delay between criminal conviction and deprivation of nationality was justified in the security context, and particularly since France had been hit by a series of serious terrorist attacks in 2015.

The Respondent argued that depriving the Applicants of their nationality did not have disproportionate consequences on the Applicants’ lives. They believed their measures were justified by the seriousness of the facts, namely that they had participated, over several years, in an organised terrorist organisation. They argued that the Applicants for this reason could be excluded from the national community.

Finally, the Respondent relied on the fact that the Applicants had another nationality and therefore the deprivation of French nationality did not leave them stateless and did not jeopardize their right to stay in France. They relied on the deportation orders of the fourth and fifth Applicants for which no decision has been taken to remove them yet, noting that no decision had been taken to remove them yet and that any future deportation decision could be challenged before the administrative courts. Noting the Applicants' allegations of torture in Morocco upon deportation, the Respondent argued that it was dismissed by the Paris Correctional Court and that, having failed to use available internal remedies, the application of this violation would be inadmissible.

Outcome

On Article 8

The Applicants argued that both their right to respect for private life and for family life had been breached. The complaint with regards to family life was deemed inadmissible, with the Court noting that ‘an order made to deprive a person of French nationality will have no effect on that person’s presence in France’ (paragraph 42), and that if the Applicants were to be denied residence permits they would be able to appeal that decision and thus the deprivation of nationality did not constitute interference with their right to respect for family life.

The Court then reiterated that the ECHR does not guarantee a right to a given nationality as such, but that nationality is an element of personal identity and any arbitrary deprivation may raise an issue under Article 8 ECHR due to the impact on the private life of the person (citing Ramadan v Malta and K2 v United Kingdom). To determine whether the deprivation was arbitrary, the Court applied a two-part test: first, it examined whether the measure was arbitrary (i.e. whether it was lawful, accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards including judicial review, and whether the authorities acted diligently and promptly); second, it examined the consequences of the deprivation on the Applicants’ private life.

On the question of diligence, the fact that the French authorities decided to strip the Applicants of their French nationalities more than ten years after the events leading to their sentences, was justified by the Government with reference to several serious terrorist attacks that same year, in 2015. The Court admitted that ‘in the presence of events of this nature, a State may reinforce its assessment of the bond of loyalty and solidarity existing between itself and persons previously convicted of a serious offence constituting an act of terrorism’ (paragraph 45) (citing Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom and Trabelsi v. Belgium). It may therefore decide to take measures that were not initially sought, subject to a proportionality test.

On the question of lawfulness, the Court further found that the measures had been lawful, and that the Applicants benefited from substantial procedural safeguards, which the Applicants exercised, including being able to assert their rights under the ECHR and the Council of State had carried out a proportionality review with reasoning in the judicial review. The Applicants were notified in advance of the intention to deprive them of nationality and informed of the legal and factual grounds; they were given one month to submit observations, which they did; the Council of State was asked for its opinion and gave its assent; the orders were reasoned; and the Applicants had the possibility  to seek urgent suspension and judicial review, during which the Council of State carried out a proportionality review and gave a reasoned decision after adversarial proceedings.

The Court thus concluded that the decision to deprive the Applicants of French nationality had not been arbitrary.

With regards to the consequences of the deprivation decisions, the Court acknowledged that the Applicants’ ability to remain in France was compromised and that they may now be subject to deportation, which would have an impact on their private life including due to the loss of employment, family separation and breakdown of social ties. However, in the Court’s view, ‘as the case stands, since no deportation order has been issued, the consequence of the deprivation of nationality for the Applicants’ private life is confined to the loss of an element of their identity’ (paragraph 49).

In its conclusion, the Court noted that the actions of the Applicants showed that ‘their attachment to France and its values is of little importance for them in the construction of their personal identity’ (paragraph 50), and that the conspiracy to prepare a terrorist act had lasted for a decade and that some of the Applicants had just acquired or were in the process of acquiring French nationality when they committed the offences.

The Court found that the deprivation decision did not render the Applicants stateless as they all held another nationality, ‘a fact to which it attaches some importance’ (paragraph 50).

The Court held that there was no violation of Article 8 ECHR.

On Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (protection against double punishment):

It also held that the complaint was inadmissible with regards to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which would apply if the Applicants had been tried or punished in criminal proceedings for an offence for which they had already been convicted. However, deprivation of nationality, as prescribed by Article 25 of the Civil Code, is not a punishment in criminal proceedings and the Court found it inadmissible in this case.

International, Regional and Domestic Instruments and Provisions Cited

Source	Instrument name	Provisions cited
Regional	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	20, 21
Regional	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union	7
Regional	European Convention on the Nationality of the Council of Europe 1997	7
International	Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948	15
International	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961	Article 6 and Article 7(3)–(6) (as cited at [24] in Tjebbes]
Regional	European Convention on Human Rights	4,8
Domestic	Civil Code	21-24, 25 and 25-1
Domestic	Decree 93-1362 of 30 December 1993	61
Domestic	Code of Administrative Law	521-1

UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines cited

This case does not cite UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines.

Available commentary

Emil Śliwiński, ‘Deprivation of Citizenship for Terrorism as a Punishment in Light of the European Convention of Human Rights’ (2025) 16(4) New Journal of European Criminal Law 407

• The author argues that the case applied the Engel criteria incorrectly. The Engel criteria is used to determine whether a measure constitutes a punishment. However, the author asserts that the Court was consistent in its application. The author raises questions as to why the court does not wholly view deprivation of citizenship as a punishment, arguing it should be treated as a severe punishment given its consequences.
• The author notes that the Court does acknowledge that denationalisation has punitive connotations, however they do not use standards that have been raised from previous cases. The article argues that loss of citizenship should be viewed more consistently as a punishment.