M.G. Tjebbes and Others v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Parties (including notable third parties)

M.G. Tjebbes, G.J.M. Koopman, E. Saleh Abady and L. Duboux (The Applicants); Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs (The Respondent): The Netherlands Government; the Irish Government; the Greek Government; the European Commission (Third Parties)

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Summary of Facts

The case concerns four Applicants, each being dual nationals of the Netherlands and a non-EU Member State. The fourth Applicant was the second Applicant’s daughter, having acquired Dutch nationality through her mother. At the time of the applications, each Applicant lived in their non-EU country of nationality.

Each Applicant had at some time held a Dutch passport, or in the case of the fourth Applicant, had been entered into their parent’s Dutch passport. These passports were issued between 1999 and 2003 and were all valid for five years. In 2014, each Applicant made individual applications for a new Dutch passport through the Dutch embassies in each of their countries of residence.

In decisions issued between 2014 and 2015, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs refused to consider the passport applications on the grounds that he considered the Applicants to have lost their Dutch nationality in accordance with Articles 15(1)(c) and 16(1)(d) of the Law on Nationality.

The Applicants complained against the Minister’s decision and subsequently brought four separate actions before the District Court of the Hague. The District Court dismissed the actions of the first, second and third Applicants, but found that the fourth Applicant’s action was well founded. The Court annulled the Minister’s decision to reject the fourth Applicant’s complaint but upheld the Minister’s original decision not to consider the passport application.

All Applicants appealed to the Dutch Council of State. The Council of State identified a key issue: whether the automatic loss of Dutch nationality, and consequently of EU citizenship, without an individual proportionality assessment is compatible with EU law. The Council of State considered Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), which confer EU citizenship and related rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’), particularly Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and Article 24(2) (child’s best interests). It noted that the situation differs from the CJEU judgment in Rottmann (C‑135/08), which concerned an individual decision withdrawing nationality, whereas in these cases the loss occurs by operation of law.

The Council of State expressed a preliminary view that, for adults, Article 15(1)(c) of the Dutch Law on Nationality might be considered proportionate because it imposes a significant ten-year period of uninterrupted residence abroad before nationality is lost and provides mechanisms to interrupt that period. As such, the Council of State expressed the view that the legislature did not act arbitrarily in adopting such law, and that it accordingly does not infringe Article 7 of the Charter. However, the Council of State questioned whether proportionality in accordance with EU law can be satisfied without an individual assessment of the consequences for each person.

For minors, the Council of State expressed doubt about the proportionality of Article 16(1)(d), which deprives a child of EU citizenship solely to maintain family unity, given the child’s best interests under Article 24(2) of the Charter and the child’s limited ability to influence the retention of their nationality.

The Council of State accordingly stayed the proceedings and referred these questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling.

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Legal Arguments

Legal Arguments by the Applicant

Not available

Legal Arguments by the Respondent

In the proceedings before the Council of State, the Minister argued that the examination of proportionality may be satisfied by a general statutory scheme, in particular the Law on Nationality.

Third Party Intervention

The Netherlands Government argued that a core objective of the Law on Nationality is to prevent individuals from obtaining or retaining Netherlands nationality when they lack, or no longer maintain, a genuine link with the Netherlands. In relation to Article 16(1)(d) of the Law, the Government stated that its purpose is to restore unity of nationality within the family. It further contended that, where the parents of a minor have no genuine link with the Netherlands, this absence of connection can, in principle, be understood as a lack of a genuine link between the child and the Member State.

Outcome

The Court clarified that, since the Applicants had not exercised their right to free movement within the EU, Article 21 TFEU did not need to be considered in its preliminary ruling.

Recalling its ruling in Rottmann, the Court subsequent reminded that while Member States have competence to set conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality, this power must be exercised with due regard to EU law where the consequences fall within its scope. Since Article 20 TFEU makes EU citizenship the fundamental status of Member State nationals, the loss of nationality, and thus EU citizenship, by individuals who hold only one Member State nationality falls within the ambit of EU law, requiring compliance with principles such as proportionality.

The Court further held that it is legitimate for a Member State to adopt legislation such as the Dutch Law on Nationality to protect the special reciprocal relationship with its nationals and to ensure that nationality reflects a genuine link between the person and the State. As such, a State may lawfully prescribe loss of nationality where that link is absent and may also seek to preserve unity of nationality within families. The Court also accepted that a lack of habitual residence for ten uninterrupted years abroad can indicate no genuine link, and similarly, if a parent lacks such a link, this may be inferred for the child.

The Court noted that these principles are supported by Article 6 and 7 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which permits loss of nationality provided it does not result in statelessness, and Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality which allows for loss of nationality where there is no genuine link or where a parent has lost nationality. The Court also found relevant that Dutch law allows individuals to interrupt the ten-year period by showing an intent to maintain a link to that State, such as by requesting nationality-related documents. Accordingly, the Court held that EU law does not preclude, in principle, such provisions, even where loss of nationality entails loss of EU citizenship.

However, referring to Rottmann, the Court held that national authorities and courts must be able to assess whether the automatic loss of nationality, and the resulting loss of EU citizenship, is proportionate in light of its consequences for the individual and their family. If national rules do not allow for any individual assessment, this would breach the principle of proportionality. The Court also added that, where appropriate after such an assessment, there must be a possibility to restore nationality retroactively.

The Court added that the case-by-case proportionality assessment must be concrete and respect fundamental rights under the Charter, notably Article 7 and Article 24(2). Relevant factors include restrictions on free movement, difficulties maintaining family or work ties, inability to renounce third-country nationality, and serious risks such as the loss of EU consular protection under Article 20(2)(c) TFEU. For minors, the Court noted that authorities must examine whether the loss of nationality fails to meet the child’s best interests because of its consequences under EU law.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that Article 20 TFEU, read with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, does not preclude legislation such as the Dutch Law on Nationality, which provides for loss of nationality by operation of law and thus loss of EU citizenship, provided that national authorities and courts can review the consequences in an individual assessment and ensure compliance with proportionality. In this context, the authorities must be able to restore nationality where appropriate, ensuring that the loss respects EU law and fundamental rights.

International, Regional and Domestic Instruments and Provisions Cited

Source	Instrument name	Provisions cited
Domestic	Dutch Law on Nationality	Articles 6, 15, 16
International	1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	Articles 6, 7
Regional	European Convention on Nationality	Article 7
Regional	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	Articles 20, 21
Regional	EU Charter of Fundamental Rights	Articles 7, 24

UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines cited

This case does not cite UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines.

Available commentary

Hanneke van Eijken, ‘Tjebbes in Wonderland: On European Citizenship, Nationality and Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 15(4) European Constitutional Law Review 714

• The author argues that Tjebbes was not groundbreaking since Rottmann had already established EU law’s relevance to nationality loss; however, the Court’s lenient proportionality approach, particularly in accepting the ten-year rule, left broad discretion to Member States while requiring an individual proportionality review to protect affected citizens. The author suggests its emphasis on fundamental rights and the Charter strengthens EU citizenship’s constitutional character beyond its internal market roots.
• The author argued that Tjebbes has wider implications, including for nationality revocation on security grounds. The author highlights that the Dutch Council of State, applying Tjebbes, confirmed that proportionality is not the sole safeguard, and that other Charter rights, such as the right to an effective remedy under Article 47, must also be respected when reviewing nationality withdrawal cases.
• The author argued that the judgment reflects that the CJEU holds a broad jurisdiction in sensitive areas, balancing State interests with individual rights, exemplified by accepting automatic nationality loss but demanding proportionality and effective remedies. The author suggests that the ruling raises further questions in the remit of nationality laws, but confirms that Member States retain discretion if individual assessments and Charter rights are guaranteed.

Caia Vlieks, ‘Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: A Next Step in European Union Case Law on Nationality Matters?’ (2019) 24(2) Tilburg Law Review 142

• The author points out that the judgment diverged from Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion, which considered a case-by-case review unnecessary for adults, fearing excessive interference with Member State competence. Yet, the AG found automatic loss for minors disproportionate, prioritizing the child’s best interests. The author notes that such contrast highlights the Court’s stronger stance on safeguarding EU rights while remaining conscious of Member States’ competence.
• The author argues that Tjebbes illustrates the Court’s view of nationality as a genuine link and its willingness to intervene where EU citizenship is at stake, although it stops short of making EU citizenship autonomous from national citizenship. The case reinforces safeguards against disproportionate consequences, but the authors that this leaves Member States broad discretion and does little for statelessness or advancing EU citizenship as an independent status. Nonetheless, the author suggests this signals that Tjebbes reinforces how EU law can act as an additional check on nationality rules traditionally reserved to states.

Laura Gyeney, 'Challenges Arising from the Multi-Level Character of EU Citizenship - The Legal Analysis of the Delvigne and Tjebbes Cases' (2020) 2020 Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 276

Note: this article analyses another case – discussion on the Tjebbes case begins on page 285

• The author notes that while the CJEU in Tjebbes confirmed the established principle from Rottmann that Member States retain competence over nationality, it introduced a significant procedural innovation by mandating that national authorities and courts must conduct an individual examination of the EU law consequences of an automatic loss of citizenship.
• The author is critical of the CJEU's reasoning  due to its problematic reliance on the international law concept of a ‘genuine link’ to justify the Dutch ten-year residence rule, as this overlooks its own settled case-law (see Micheletti) which had superseded this notion within the EU legal order. This further demonstrates an uncertain approach by failing to substantively assess whether the automatic ten-year rule is itself a suitable tool for achieving that legitimate aim.
• The author argues that the judgment's engagement with fundamental rights is incomplete and marginal. Despite referencing Article 7 of the Charter and the best interests of the child, the CJEU degrades these to mere components of the ‘ancillary examination’, fails to address the regulation's potential violation of the principle of equality by discriminating against dual citizens.
• The author concludes that ‘Tjebbes is also telling with respect to the fact what the CJEU believes to be the essence of the status in question,’ namely that ‘the central elements of this status are constituted by the rights of free movement and residence,’ while the political/public life dimension is essentially missing from the list of EU law consequences (page 296).