Ramadan v Malta

Parties (including notable third parties)

Ramadan (The Applicant); The Maltese Government (The Respondent)

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Summary of Facts

The Applicant was an Egyptian citizen. In 1991, he came to Malta on a Maltese tourist visa which was valid for three months. He stayed in Malta for longer than three months, overstaying his visa. In 1993, the Applicant married a Maltese citizen. He subsequently enquired about his ‘exempt person status’ (a status that allows a non-citizen spouse to reside and move freely in Malta, applicable before Malta joined the EU) and started the process to obtain Maltese citizenship through his marriage.

In 1994, the Applicant’s exempt person status was confirmed, and he was then registered as a Maltese citizen. On this basis, he then renounced his Egyptian citizenship, as confirmed by a letter from the embassy of Egypt, as dual nationality was not possible under either Egyptian or Maltese law.

In 1998, the Applicant's marriage was annulled in court proceedings. It was found in the judgment that the only reason for the marriage was for the Applicant to remain in Malta and gain citizenship. The Applicant did not inform the authorities of this annulment and he remained in Malta with his citizenship.

In 2003, the Applicant married a Russian citizen and inquired about the exempt person status of his Russian wife. It was only at this point that the authorities became aware of the reason for the annulment of his first marriage.

In 2006, the Applicant was made aware that an order was made to deprive him of his citizenship as this was obtained by fraud, as revealed in the judgment that annulled his first marriage. This decision was challenged by the Applicant, with specific emphasis on the fact that he had three Maltese children.

A committee of inquiry was established. The Applicant participated, was represented by a lawyer, and submitted evidence. However, the committee’s final recommendation to the Minister was not made available to the Applicant, and requests by his lawyer for copies of the records were refused.

On 31 July 2007, the Minister ordered that the Applicant be deprived of his citizenship with immediate effect. The order contained no reasoning. The Applicant was required to return his passport and certificate of registration, but he failed to do so and continued using his Maltese passport to travel until it expired in 2014.

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Legal Arguments

Legal Arguments by the Applicant

The Applicant argued the decision to deprive him of his citizenship was not made in accordance with the law. It would mean he was at risk of being separated from his family and interfered with his right to respect for his family and private life, under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).

The Applicant further argued that the deprivation proceedings lacked procedural fairness: the committee’s recommendation was withheld, and the Minister’s order was unreasoned.

The Applicant also claimed that he was a victim in line with Article 34 ECHR. He recognised that he had not yet been deported or removed but argued that the threat of this happening was imminent. He mentioned that the government had at no point stated that they would not remove or deport him, they had called his stay in Malta ‘precarious’ following the annulment of his first marriage (paragraph 52).

The Applicant complained that the decision left him stateless. He submitted that this left him living in a state of uncertainty and he was unable to leave the country as he was fearful that he would not be let back in.

The Applicant contended that citizenship is a gateway to certain rights and that permits or other temporary solutions would not resolve his issue of statelessness. He further argued that here, the order was not done in accordance with the law, was disproportionate, and that the State failed to protect him from statelessness.

Legal Arguments by the Respondent

The Government contested that the Applicant could claim victim status in line with Article 34. The position of the Government was that only if the State had already decided to take steps against him could he claim to be a victim and interference would only be relevant upon the execution or implementation of this decision. Therefore, they argued in this case, there was no removal order awaiting execution or implementation, nor had any practical steps been taken to remove the Applicant from Malta. The Government submitted that deprivation of citizenship is not synonymous with removal from Malta.

The Government also submitted that as the Applicant was still able to work and live in Malta, he had faced no significant disadvantage due to the deprivation of his citizenship. It also submitted that the Applicant had provided no evidence that he was incapable of re-instating his Egyptian citizenship.

The Government argued that ‘the Convention did not guarantee a right to acquire a particular citizenship and that the issue of whether an Applicant had an arguable right to acquire the citizenship of a State must in principle be resolved by reference to the domestic law of that State’ (paragraph 75).

Outcome

On Admissibility

The Court found that the Applicant was not a victim due to a violation of Article 8 regarding the deportation, but he was a victim regarding the revocation of his citizenship.

The Court held that ‘an Applicant cannot claim to be the ‘victim’ of a deportation measure if the measure is not enforceable’, which applies ‘in cases where execution of the deportation order has been stayed indefinitely or otherwise deprived of legal effect, and where any decision by the authorities to proceed with deportation can be appealed against before the relevant courts’ (paragraph 53).

In deciding the Applicant was not a victim, the Court stated that, since he was stateless, ‘it cannot be said that he is under a threat of expulsion’ given the unlikelihood he would return to Egypt and, if he did, the amount of time during which he would be able to appeal (paragraph 56).

On the Merits

The Court held that ‘although the right to citizenship is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual’ (paragraph 62).

This is an acknowledgement from the court that denial of citizenship may possibly amount to a human rights issue under Article 8.

The Court noted that most of its caselaw before it had been with regards to acquisition or denial of nationality. However, the Court considered that the loss of nationality acquired at birth or later in life can have the same impact on a person’s private and family life, therefore there should be no difference in which test to apply.

The Court found that the decision here was done in accordance with the law and adhered to procedural safeguards, as the Applicant was notified and had opportunity to seek a remedy. Although it could be questioned whether the authorities acted diligently, any delay in time did not adversely affect the Applicant. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision was not arbitrary.

The Court also found that the Applicant was not adversely affected by the Respondent’s decision. It held that neither Article 8 nor any other provision of the Convention can be construed as guaranteeing the right to a particular type of residence permit. Other pathways to residence and citizenship were available to the Applicant, which he failed to try to pursue.

With regards to the Applicant’s claim that he is currently stateless, the Court noted that the letter from the embassy stated that his request to renounce Egyptian nationality was approved and his passport was withdrawn, but the Applicant had not provided the Court with any official document confirming such renunciation. He had also not presented any information as to the possibilities of reacquiring Egyptian nationality in the event he had indeed renounced it. The Court further noted that ‘the fact that a foreigner has renounced his or her nationality of a State does not mean in principle that another State has the obligation to regularise his or her stay in the country’ (paragraph 92).

Since the Applicant was found not to be at risk of deportation, the Court held that the State had no positive obligation regarding the Applicant’s rights under Article 8 as it arose in this case (paragraph 94).

The Court held, by five votes to two, that there was no violation of Article 8.

Two judges dissented from the majority’s decision, and both considered that there should have been a violation of Article 8.

Judge Pinto de Albuquerque dissented, arguing the 1998 annulment judgment was highly suspect because marriages of convenience rarely produce children. He held that the eight-year delay by authorities amounted to an effective confirmation of his citizenship, making its sudden revocation an unfair reversal. He concluded that the procedure was fundamentally unfair, the creation of statelessness was disproportionate, and citizenship is core to identity and protected under Article 8. The Judge noted that ‘although this case had all the ingredients for the Court to revisit its still insufficient case-law on the right to citizenship, unfortunately the Chamber did not seize the opportunity’. He also affirmed that States ‘do not therefore have absolute sovereignty to deny citizenship to any person for any reason, as is also crystal-clear from a purposeful reading of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness’. Judge Zupančič dissented briefly, stating only that he could not agree with the majority.

International, Regional and Domestic Instruments and Provisions Cited

Source	Instrument name	Provisions cited
Regional	European Convention on Human Rights	Article 8
Regional	European Convention on Nationality	Article 3, 4, 7
Regional	Committee of Ministers to member States on the avoidance and reduction of statelessness	Recommendation No. R (99) 18
Regional	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	Article 20
Domestic	Constitution of Malta	Article 44

UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines cited

UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons

Key paragraphs of the Guidelines referred to

Court's application of Guidelines

Footnotes 1, 23 and 54 of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s dissenting opinion refers to the former UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness nos. 1-4, including with regards to the definition of a stateless person and procedural safeguards. It also refers to the European Network on Statelessness Good Practice Guide: “Statelessness – determination and the protection status of stateless persons” (2013) at footnote 54. The judgment itself does not refer to the guidelines.

Available commentary

Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, ‘“Children of a lesser god”: the rights of migrants and refugees under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2023) 3 E.H.R.L.R 217

• The author, who is one of the dissenting judges in Ramadan v Malta, describes the decision as disappointing. He suggests that the Court did not engage well enough in other authorities, such as international instruments, when coming to their decision. He believes that the Court should have found a violation of Article 8 in the case. The author states that ‘[i]t is time for the Court to recognise explicitly that state citizenship belongs to the core of someone’s identity, which is protected by art.8 of the Convention, and it is disappointing it failed to do so in Ramadan v Malta’ (paragraph 228).

Barbara von Rütte, ‘Social Identity and the Right to Belong – The ECtHR’s Judgement in Hoti v Croatia’ (2019) 24 Tilburg Law Review 147

• The article discusses the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 8 in the case of Hoti v Croatia.
• The article compares Hoti to Ramadan. It argues that in Ramadan the Court had doubts as to whether the Applicant was stateless, requiring him to present proof that he was. They also failed to consider statelessness as a factor of particular vulnerability. The author argues the case of Hoti was far more positive in its approach.
• The author points out that Ramadan confirms that the notion of private life is wide enough to include aspects of one’s social identity; however, in this case, the Court did not regard the impact on the social identity on the Applicant to amount to a violation of their private life.

Louise Reyntjens, ‘Citizenship Deprivation Under the European Convention-System: A Case Study of Belgium’ (2019) 1(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 263

• The author uses the case to help illustrate the ECtHR’s approach to deprivation of citizenship, which is viewed as an issue under Article 8.
• The author believes the Court’s use of Article 8 in cases of citizenship deprivation is very narrow, providing support only in connection to expulsion. This leaves the individual with very little protection. The article explains that while it was mainly agreed that the Applicant was stateless, this played very little involvement in determining a violation of Article 8 given that he had not be expelled from Malta. She considers the fault of this decision, believing it has boiled down the protection afforded to an individual as per Article 8 to merely protection against expulsion, when it is indeed much more than that.
• The article describes the decision as one that contributes to the discrepancy of how the Court applies Article 8.