Andrejeva v. Latvia

Parties (including notable third parties)

Ms Natālija Andrejeva (Applicant); The Latvian Government (Respondent)

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Summary of Facts

The Applicant was born in Kazakhstan and entered Latvian territory in 1954, at a time when the territory was a Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. The Applicant was permanently resident in Latvia ever since and took up employment in a recycling plant in 1966.

From 1973 until November 1990, the Applicant remained in Latvia but worked for Soviet public bodies headquartered in Russia and Ukraine, and her salary was paid monthly by postal transfer. From November 1990 until her retirement in 1997, the Applicant worked for employers based in Latvia. In August 1991, Latvia regained full independence, and in December 1991 the Soviet Union, of which the Applicant had previously been a national, ceased to exist. The Applicant was left stateless and was later granted the status of ‘permanently resident non-citizen’ in Latvia in 1995.

In 1997, the Latvian Social-Insurance Board calculated the Applicant’s retirement pension. The Applicant was informed that under the relevant legislation (the State Pensions Act 1995), only the years spent working for Latvian employers could be taken into consideration in calculating the entitlement of foreign nationals and stateless persons living in Latvia. Latvian citizens, on the other hand, were entitled to a pension in respect of all periods of time worked, including those worked outside Latvian territory and irrespective of their social security contributions. Accordingly, the Applicant’s pension was calculated without considering the 17 years during which she had worked for organisations based in Ukraine and Russia, resulting in a monthly entitlement of 20 lati (approximately 35 EUR).

The Applicant brought administrative and judicial proceedings against the Social-Insurance authorities, which were dismissed. She later appealed to the Senate of the Supreme Court in 1999. Although the registry notified her of the exact date and time of the public hearing, the hearing began earlier than scheduled, and the Senate examined the case before all the parties arrived. The Senate heard a public prosecutor’s submission in favour of allowing the appeal but ultimately dismissed it, upholding the lower courts’ findings that the period of employment with Ukrainian and Russian organisations could not be taken into account. As she had been unable to participate in the hearing, the Applicant requested a re-examination, but this was refused by the Senate, with assurances that all relevant arguments had been considered.

In February 2000, the Applicant was informed that, on the basis of an agreement reached between Latvia and Ukraine, her pension had been recalculated as of 1 November 1999 to take account of the years she had worked for her Ukrainian-based employers. A later agreement with Russia, approved in October 2008, was expected to further increase her pension once in force.

The Chamber to which the case was assigned decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber on 11 December 2007.

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Legal Arguments

Legal Arguments by the Applicant

The Applicant complained that the Latvian authorities’ application of domestic law, which resulted in the refusal to grant her a State pension for employment in the former Soviet Union prior to 1991 solely because she lacked Latvian nationality, constituted discriminatory treatment in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

In response to the Government’s preliminary objections, the Applicant argued that her victim status remained unaffected despite the pension increase following the Latvia–Ukraine agreement, as no retroactive payments were provided, and that such limitation was also present in the 2008 agreement with Russia. The Applicant further contended that the Government’s objection concerning jurisdiction was unfounded, arguing that Latvia’s non-successor status was irrelevant because her claim concerned discriminatory treatment under Article 14, not a standalone pecuniary right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. By establishing a pension scheme that credited pre-1991 work abroad for citizens, Latvia had brought this issue within its jurisdiction and was obliged to act without discrimination.

On the merits, the Applicant stressed that she had lived in Latvia since age 12 and spent her entire working life there, yet her pension was significantly lower than that of Latvian citizens in the same position. The Applicant submitted that nationality was therefore the sole criterion for this difference, which had no objective and reasonable justification. To support this finding, the Applicant noted that her employers had paid social taxes to Soviet authorities on the same basis as for those later recognised as Latvian nationals, and that had the Soviet Union not dissolved, she would have received a pension from its central budget. The discriminatory distinction was introduced only in 1996 by the State Pensions Act 1995, without any explanation or justification.

The Applicant further criticised the interpretation of the Act by the Supreme Court, which deemed her not to have worked ‘in Latvia’ for 17 years, despite no change in her workplace, duties, or trade union affiliation during that time. She argued that this restrictive interpretation by the Social Insurance authorities was arbitrary and unreasonable, amounting to discrimination prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention, and should not have been endorsed by the Supreme Court. The Applicant submitted that this exclusion caused her substantial loss, depriving her of pension rights for 17 years of employment, leaving her with only minimal allowances that did not cover basic expenses.

The Applicant later acknowledged that she could apply for Latvian nationality under the Latvian Citizenship Act, but argued that the naturalisation requirements were excessively strict, particularly for elderly persons, and cited prior criticism of these provisions by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and Commissioner for Human Rights. Notwithstanding, the Applicant submitted that her choice not to naturalise was not decisive, as the rights and obligations attached to the status of a ‘permanently resident non-citizen’ were evidence of the legal ties between the person concerned and the Latvian State, despite not being a tie of nationality. Lastly, the Applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the issue should be resolved through international social security agreements, noting that even if the agreement with Russia came into force, Latvia would remain responsible for paying the relevant pension portion, as her entire working life was spent in Latvia.

In addition, the Applicant complained of a violation of Article 6(1), arguing that she was unable to attend the hearing of her appeal on points of law, which infringed her right to a fair hearing. She argued that the nature of the proceedings made her presence essential and was guaranteed by domestic law.

Legal Arguments by the Respondent

The Government raised two preliminary objections before the Grand Chamber. First, they maintained that the Applicant had partly ceased to be a victim under Article 34 of the Convention because her pension was recalculated and increased in 2000 to include years worked for Ukrainian companies. Although the recalculation applied only prospectively, the Government argued that this complied with Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which prohibits retroactive effect of international agreements unless expressly provided, and that any difference from a retroactive adjustment was minimal. Second, the Government raised that the complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 fell outside Latvia’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention, asserting that responsibility for pension rights relating to employment in the Soviet Union lay with Russia as the successor State, not Latvia, which was not a successor State. Accordingly, the Government argued that the Applicant should seek entitlements from Russian or Ukrainian authorities.

On the merits, the Government disputed the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and consequently also of Article 14, to the Applicant’s pension rights for employment before 1991. In particular, the Government stressed the non-contributory, solidarity-based nature of the Soviet-era system and argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the State Pensions Act was accordingly lawful and proportionate. Even if assuming the applicability of such provisions, the Government argued that the differential treatment of the Applicant fell within Latvia’s wide margin of appreciation in social policy, particularly during the transition to independence and the creation of a sustainable pension system under limited budgetary resources. The Government submitted that it had assumed responsibility for periods worked in its territory by permanent residents, regardless of their nationality status, but was under no obligation to cover employment elsewhere. Reserving additional guarantees for Latvian nationals was, in the Government’s view, legitimate and proportionate given financial constraints and the need to balance public and private interests.

The Government further contended that the Applicant could resolve the issue by applying for Latvian nationality, which would entitle her to a full pension. Her refusal to naturalise, despite being eligible since 1998, was in their view decisive. The Government also noted that pension entitlements for employment outside Latvia should be addressed through bilateral social security agreements, such as those already concluded and recently approved with Russia.

Concerning Article 6(1), the Government argued that the Applicant’s allegations could no longer be verified as the hearing file had been destroyed and, in any event, no violation occurred, maintaining that her attendance could not have influenced the outcome.

Outcome

The Court rejected the preliminary objections concerning victim status and jurisdiction, finding that the Government had lodged each inadmissibility complaint out of time according to the Rules of the Court. These objections were also dismissed on substantive grounds, with the Court holding that the Applicant’s situation remained unchanged despite the passing of the 2008 Latvia–Russia agreement, and consequently that her status as a victim under Article 34 was unaffected. On jurisdiction, the Court reiterated that Article 1 reflects State responsibility for acts of its organs and is not negated by partial attribution to another State. Moreover, since the Applicant challenged a measure by a Latvian authority under Latvian law, examined by Latvian courts, the Court held that the Applicant’s complaint clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the Latvian State.

The Court then examined the applicability of Article 14, reiterating that it has no independent existence and applies only in relation to rights guaranteed by other Convention provisions. It therefore considered whether the Applicant’s interests fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, ultimately finding that while that provision does not guarantee a right to any pension, once a State establishes a pension scheme, the rights and interests under it fall within its ambit. Accordingly, the Court found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 interests were engaged in this specific case given that Latvian law applied the pension scheme differently to work performed in the Soviet Union by nationals and non-nationals, and the Applicant was refused such entitlements solely for lacking Latvian nationality. This differential treatment was sufficient for Article 14 to apply.

As to the merits, the Court reiterated that once an Applicant establishes the existence of differential treatment under Article 14, the burden of proof shifts to the Government to justify such treatment. In this case, the Court accepted that the distinction pursued at least one legitimate aim broadly compatible with the Convention’s objectives, namely protecting Latvia’s economic system during the transition following independence. In assessing whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between that aim and the means employed, the Court noted that it was undisputed that the authorities’ refusal to credit the Applicant’s employment outside Latvian territory was based solely on her lack of Latvian nationality and status as a ‘permanently resident non-citizen,’ whereby a Latvian citizen in the same position would have received the disputed pension portion, and that if the Applicant became a naturalised Latvian national she would automatically qualify for the full pension. Accordingly, the Court held that nationality was the sole criterion for such differential treatment and stressed that in previous cases it had held that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before it could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention’ (paragraph 87).

The Court subsequently found no such reason. In particular, it noted that it had not been established that the Applicant failed to meet other conditions for entitlement to a pension for all her years of employment, and that as a stateless ‘permanently resident non-citizen’ Latvia was the only State with which she had stable legal ties and which could objectively assume responsibility for her social security. Accordingly, the Court found the Government’s arguments did not demonstrate a reasonable relationship of proportionality. It also rejected the Government’s argument that the issue should be resolved through bilateral social security agreements, and dismissed the relevance of the argument that the Applicant could avoid discrimination by acquiring Latvian nationality. Here, the Court noted that the prohibition of discrimination established in Article 14 is meaningful only if an applicant’s situation is assessed as it stands, as any other formulation would rendered it devoid of substance. Accordingly, the Grand Chamber concluded that the difference in treatment was unjustified and held by sixteen votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

In a partly dissenting opinion, Judge Ziemele disagreed with the finding of a violation and argued that the majority had failed to give due consideration to the context under which the post-Soviet Latvian pension system was established, particularly its prior unlawful annexation as a Soviet Socialist Republic and the non-contributory, State-based nature of the pension within a collapsed national economy. Accordingly, while agreeing with the general nature that very weighty reasons should exist for any distinction based on nationality, Judge Ziemele did not agree that the Applicant’s treatment was unjustified in this case. In addition, Judge Ziemele suggested that the majority omitted a consideration of the relative ease means by which the Applicant could have acquired a nationality, including through registration of Russian nationality or by naturalisation as Latvian, which would have increased her pension entitlement.

Concerning the complaints under Article 6(1) of the Convention, the Court disagreed with the Government’s arguments and held that the Applicant, as the main party to proceedings, was entitled to the full safeguards of the adversarial principle. The presence of a prosecutor did not curtail her right to be present which she wished to exercise, and the Court therefore found a violation of this provision.

International, Regional and Domestic Instruments and Provisions Cited

Source	Instrument name	Provisions cited
Regional	European Convention on Human Rights	Articles 1, 6, 14, 34, 41, 46, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Domestic	Civil Procedure Act	Section 90
Domestic	Public Prosecutor’s Office Act	Section 2
Domestic	State Pensions Act 1995	Section 3(1), Section 9(1) and (2), Section 10
International	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties	Article 28

UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines cited

This case does not cite UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines.

Available commentary

Ingrid Leijten, ‘From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 13(2) Human Rights Law Review 309

• The author highlights that the Court moved beyond a narrow dispute concerning pension entitlements and engaged with complex historical and political issues arising from the USSR’s dissolution. This illustrates how the Court asserted its competence to decide whether Latvia should have created rights for permanent resident non-citizens.
• The author stresses that the Court’s review was stringent and resulted in real protection for the Applicant’s social security interest, despite the political sensitivity of the case. By finding a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with A1P1, the Court affirmed that once a State creates rights, it cannot discriminate on nationality grounds, even in the face of complex economic and historical considerations.

Cathérine Van de Graaf and Yannick Schoog, ‘Savickis v Latvia: The Role of Immutability and Choice in the Discrimination Analysis of the ECtHR’ (2025) 25(2) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 160.

Note: The Savickis case is a direct sequel to Andrejeva, reaching the opposite conclusion on nearly identical facts.

• The authors argue that the Savickis Grand Chamber departed from Andrejeva by accepting the Latvian government's justification for differential pension treatment. This acceptance was based on the novel reasoning that the Applicants' lack of Latvian citizenship was ‘largely a matter of personal aspiration rather than an immutable situation,’ since they could have chosen to naturalize.
• The article heavily criticises this logic, framing it as placing the onus on the individual to avoid discrimination by altering their legal status. The authors warn that applying this ‘mutability’ test to other protected grounds like religion, gender, or disability would lead to ‘absurd outcomes’ and weaken the fundamental protections of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
• Ultimately the article argues that the Court's approach allows States to justify discrimination based on mutable traits and undermines the principle that individuals should be protected from discrimination based on their status ‘exactly as it stands,’ as established in Andrejeva.