Habbal et al v Argentina

Parties (including notable third parties)

Raghda Habbal (Applicant); The Republic of Argentina (Respondent); Semillero de Litigación ante Sistemas Internacionales de Protección de Derechos Humanos (‘SELIDH’) (Amicus Curiae)

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Summary of Facts

The Applicant, Raghda Habbal, was a Syrian national who moved from Spain to Argentina in 1990 with her husband and their three daughters. Her son was born in Argentina in 1991. The family obtained permanent residence in July 1990 and in December 1991, the Applicant sought naturalisation but was three months short of the two-year residency requirement. She qualified instead under an investment provision by demonstrating ownership of significant property, and her naturalisation was approved in April 1992, at which point she also renounced her Syrian nationality.

Later that year, following reports linking her husband to drug and weapons trafficking, his permanent residence was revoked. On 11 May 1992, Resolution No. 1088 was issued. It revoked the Applicant’s permanent residency status and that of her daughters, declaring the family unlawfully present in Argentina, and ordering their expulsion. Arrest warrants were issued the next day, although the detention and expulsion orders were not executed but remained in force until 1 June 2020 when they were revoked. The Resolution also initiated proceedings to nullify the Applicant’s naturalisation. On 27 October 1994, an Acting Federal Judge revoked her citizenship, finding it had been obtained by fraudulent means. The Applicant appealed, but the Mendoza Court of Appeals rejected her appeal in June 1995, the Federal Court of Appeals did so in October 1995, and the Supreme Court of Justice declared her final appeal inadmissible in February 1996.

Having exhausted domestic remedies, the Applicant's representatives lodged a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 24 May 1996.

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Legal Arguments

Legal Arguments by the Applicant

Regarding Resolution No. 1088 (expulsion and detention orders), it was argued that Argentina violated Article 22(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’)  by ordering the expulsion of the Applicant while she was still an Argentine citizen, as the ACHR prohibits expelling a person from the territory of which they are a national. Furthermore, the immigration proceedings violated due process guarantees under Article 8(1) and 8(2) because the alleged victims were never notified of the proceedings, denied legal assistance, not heard, and unable to appeal. Likewise, the arrest warrant and preventive detention order violated Article 7 (right to personal liberty) because it was issued without individualized justification, proportionality assessment, or consideration of less restrictive measures.

Regarding the four children, Argentina violated Article 19 (rights of the child) and Article 8(1) by failing to consider the best interests of the child, not using specialized personnel, not hearing the children's views, and ignoring the impact of expulsion on family unity. Ultimately, Resolution 1088 was a punitive administrative action based on alleged offenses committed by the husband/father and not the victims themselves.

Regarding the revocation of Ms. Habbal's citizenship, the Applicant argued that Argentina violated Article 8(2) (presumption of innocence) because the judge revoked her citizenship before the criminal proceedings against her had concluded, effectively presuming her guilt. The State violated Article 9 (principle of legality) by revoking citizenship without proper legal basis and violated Article 20 (right to nationality) because the Applicant  was rendered stateless after renouncing her Syrian nationality to obtain Argentine citizenship, and the State failed to consider or prevent this risk. The decision revoking citizenship lacked adequate reasoning under Article 8(1).

Legal Arguments by the Respondent

The State argued that the case should be dismissed because the actions of the immigration authorities ‘neither had, nor are presently having, any effect on the freedom of movement and residence and other rights of Ms. Habbal and her son and daughters, so there was no case or dispute that warranted the Court's intervention’ (paragraph 79). The State maintained there was no injury, damage or interest for which a ruling of the Court could order redress or compensation. The State further contended that ‘the recommendations of the Merits Report had been implemented effectively’ (referring to the Commission's published determination on the merits of the case prior to judicial review),  particularly since Resolution 1088 had been revoked on June 1, 2020, and argued that subjecting the State to the Court's jurisdiction, despite the fact that it had complied fully with the Commission's recommendations, went against the logic of the Inter-American System (paragraph 18).

Regarding the revocation of citizenship, the State contended that the Commission's conclusions ‘were based on an incorrect interpretation of the legal principles involved, particularly with respect to the scope of the principle of “grounds for prejudiciality” and its derivation from the principle of presumption of innocence’ (paragraph 89). The State argued that what the Federal Court had taken into account was not her individual criminal responsibility for submitting documents containing false statements, but rather the false information contained in the documents on which the granting of naturalization was based. Therefore, there was no need to wait for a criminal judgment to determine that 'fraud' had been committed, since the connotation was not criminal, but civil, according to the Federal Court's analysis, and consequently the revocation of citizenship did not violate the principle of the presumption of innocence since it did not judge or prejudge her criminal guilt.

Outcome

On Resolution 1088 (expulsion and detention orders)

The Court first found that the content of Resolution 1088 and the procedure followed for its adoption ‘constituted a breach of the obligations of the State’ (paragraph 80). The Court found the Respondent (1) unlawfully ordered the expulsion of a citizen (Article 22(5)); (2) failed to follow lawful procedures for expelling lawful permanent residents (Article 22(6)); (3) denied the victims a fair hearing with due process guarantees (Article 8(1) and 8(2)); and (4) failed to provide the required special measures of protection to the children involved (Article 19). Specifically, the Court noted that the State ordered Ms. Habbal's expulsion after she had obtained Argentine nationality and before her citizenship was revoked, in violation of Article 22(5) which prohibits expelling a person from the territory of which they are a national. Additionally, the Court found that Resolution 1088 offered no individualized justification or assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the preventive detention measure, as required under Article 7 of the ACHR (right to personal liberty).

However, despite these findings, the Court concluded that the State was not internationally responsible. The Court based this conclusion on two key determinations. Firstly, the Court found that ‘there is no evidence to prove that Resolution 1088, although it was in force from 1992 to 2020, interfered in any way with the possibility of the alleged victims remaining in, or entering, Argentina, or otherwise impeded the exercise of their personal freedom’ (paragraph 81). The Court noted that the Appellant entered Argentina on at least four occasions after Resolution 1088 was issued, between 1994 and 1996, and there is no indication that her right to freedom of movement or personal freedom was restricted. Secondly, the Court noted that on June 1, 2020, the National Immigration Department revoked Resolution 1088. The Court held that this decision effectively ended the State's non-compliance and that the revocation of Resolution 1088 constituted an adequate reparation. Applying the principle of complementarity, the Court held that since the violations ceased, and reparation was made, Argentina is not internationally responsible.

Findings on revocation of citizenship

The Court found no violations regarding the revocation of Ms. Habbal's citizenship. Regarding the presumption of innocence, the Court held that the Acting Federal Judge did not violate the principle of presumption of innocence in ordering the revocation of nationality in civil proceedings before a judgment was delivered in criminal proceedings, since the facts on which the naturalization application was based could be declared false without having to wait for a final ruling on the crime of making false statements.

Regarding the duty to state reasons, the Court found that the judge explains the reasons why he reached the conclusions that he did, setting forth the facts, grounds and rules of procedure involved" and therefore there was no failure to state the reasons under Article 8(1).

Regarding statelessness, the Court first affirmed that Article 20(2) of the ACHR indicates that ‘every person has the right to the nationality of the State in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality’, and that this principle must be interpreted in light of the obligation to ensure the exercise of the rights to all persons subject to the State's jurisdiction. It also outlined the five-part test for non-arbitrary deprivation of citizenship (at paragraph 97) - the act must: respect legality, equality and non-discrimination; prevent statelessness; be proportional; and respect due process with special protections for children. Applying this to the Applicant the Court acknowledged the judge did not consider statelessness, but found no violation because evidence showed she entered Argentina as a Syrian and Spanish national.  The Court also accepted the State's assertion that ‘since Ms. Habbal's renunciation of her nationality of origin had no effect in Syria, she never ceased to be a national of that State’ (paragraph 103). Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no risk of the alleged victim being rendered stateless.

International, Regional and Domestic Instruments and Provisions Cited

Source	Instrument name	Provisions cited
Regional	American Convention on Human Rights (1969)	Article 1(1): Obligation to Respect Rights; Article 7: Right to Personal Liberty; Article 8: Right to a Fair Trial; Article 9: Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws (Principle of legality); Article 19: Rights of the Child; Article 20: Right to Nationality; Article 22: Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence; Article 24: Right to Equal Protection (Equality before the law)
Domestic	Argentine Constitution (1853)	Article 20: Rights of foreigners and naturalization
Domestic	Law No. 346 (1863): Law on Citizenship	Article 2, paragraph 1: requirements for naturalization
Regional	Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court	Multiple cited in the footnotes
International	Convention on the Rights of the Child	General comments cited in the footnotes: fn 109, fn 93

UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines cited

This case does not cite UNHCR Statelessness Guidelines.

Available commentary

Maria Jose Recalde-Vela, 'Habbal et al v Argentina: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights' Test on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality' (2023) 5(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 217.

• The author argues that despite the ruling not favouring the victims, the case remains valuable because it advances the Court’s discussion on the scope of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. However, she criticises the Court's finding that Habbal faced no risk of statelessness by pointing out that this conclusion relied solely on her entry records between 1994 and 1996 and an untested assumption that her renunciation of Syrian nationality had no effect, and also without any verification through diplomatic channels with Syrian authorities.
• The author also criticises the Court's reasoning by contrasting it with the Court's earlier ruling in the cases Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v Dominican Republic. She argues that ‘the IACtHR clearly considers it necessary, in the context of deprivation of nationality, for there to be ample evidence that a person has a 'second' nationality’ (page 222), and that ‘it is difficult to accept the argument that multiple entries into a state's territory on different passports and the assumption that the nationality of origin was retained constitutes sufficient proof that the person did not become stateless’ (page 222).
• The author states that a new nationality after being stripped of a previous one does not erase the fact that the deprivation still occured and she criticises the Court's unwillingness to declare State responsibility or order reparations despite the expulsion order having been in place for 30 years.